It is first necessary to distinguish between the different types of perpetrators. It is expected that the vast majority of security-related incidents involving drones will be the result of ignorance; recreational users who are not malicious in their intent and are (or claim to be) unaware of the potential disruption or damage their actions cause. The smaller fraction of incidents will be due to intentional actors; those who are aware of the laws they are flouting when seeking to snap that unique holiday photo. An even smaller fraction of these intentional actors will have malicious intent; people out to cause significant damage or disruption through the misuse of a drone. Different strategies to manage the security risks posed by the different types of actors will be needed.
In terms of risk mitigation, focusing on the drone yields few effective risk mitigating measures. Controlling access to the technology is not a viable option - that drone has already flown. Hardcoded geo-fence systems, like that being rolled out by DJI, and even universal “flight termination commands”, which can be triggered by approved government agencies, have been bandied about as possible solutions. The latter is likely to cause more safety and security issues than it is likely to address. However, software protection mechanisms like geo-fencing are useful but not a panacea to the security problem. A regulatory mandate for such software functions would be needed as there is little by way of incentive for drone manufacturers to implement them – they come at additional cost and can place a drone product at a potential competitive disadvantage to other “unrestricted” products. Drone-based security features would not be effective for threats posed by intentional actors, for home-built drones, or for those threats where the geographical location of the “target” is not known or mapped.
For these reasons it is not all that surprising to see a new industry in anti-drone technologies emerging. Passive acoustic arrays (e.g., DroneShieldTM), radio frequency receivers, and electro-optical, infrared, and radar sensors have all been used as a means for drone detection and tracking. Intervention technologies range from simple handheld net guns through to comprehensive “drone defense” systems that utilize directed electromagnetic energy (e.g. Anti-UAV Defence SystemTM developed by Blighter Surveillance Systems, Chess Dynamics, and Enterprise Control Systems Ltd.) or lasers (e.g., Boeing’s High Energy Laser Mobile DemonstratorTM). Electronic warfare technologies previously used by the military are now finding new applications in anti-drone systems. Such EW technologies include jamming and spoofing, which target command and control links and navigation systems most commonly used by commercial drones. Even anti-drone-drones, such as MALOU Tech’s Drone Interceptor, have been fielded. Anecdotally, the humble garden hose has also been said to be an effective, albeit short range, anti-drone tool.
These detection and intervention systems will vary in their effectiveness and cost. What is becoming apparent is that there is no one anti-drone system that will be suitable for all drone types, environments, and subsequent threats. Of particular note is that many of the currently available intervention systems are effective only for drones operating at lower altitudes. It is also worth noting that many of the commercially available anti-drone technologies have only been demonstrated in clear and controlled test environments. There are particular challenges to the safe and effective use of these devices in urban environments. Urban or built-up environments are high clutter environments (acoustic, radio frequency, etc.), which makes the reliable detection of drones all the more difficult, particularly smaller drones operating at low altitudes around tall structures. There are also some fairly significant safety issues associated with the use of intervention technologies in urban areas. A disabled drone falling from height can pose a credible hazard to people and property on the ground. The use of non eye-safe lasers also presents an obvious safety issue. Jammers and directed EM devices can disrupt other critical electronic and communication devices (e.g., health care equipment, signaling, radio navigation systems, etc.). Then there is the threat such devices pose to other legitimate airspace users. Currently, there are no regulations and standards specific to anti-drone devices although there are general regulations, which would be applicable to some classes of anti-drone systems. Regulations and standards pertaining to the design and safe use of anti-drone technologies are needed, and until they are developmed, let the buyer, and public, beware.
Detecting and neutralizing the threat posed by the drone itself is only part of an effective security response. Apprehension of the offender is an entirely different problem. The offending operator could be anywhere within radio line of sight of the drone. At the other extreme are internet-enabled and remotely deployable drones, which can be operated from anywhere in the world. Mandatory registration and marking of drones will help but only in the apprehension of non-malicious actors. I’m fairly certain that those people who have malicious intent aren’t going to write their name on their drone.
The aforementioned strategies are all reactive security risk controls; proactive and preventative security risk controls are also needed. Education is perhaps the best strategy for reducing the number of security incidents caused by unintentional and non-malicious offenders. .n the management of the broad