Developing An Unmanned Aircraft Culture Of Safety by Terry Miller
"Men Wanted for Hazardous Journey. Small Wages. Bitter Cold. Long Months of Complete Darkness. Constant Danger, Safe Return Doubtful. Honor and Recognition in Case of Success."
– Sir Ernest Shackleton
People don't like to lose money. This aversion, however, is based more on the likelihood of loss than the amount of loss. It is not the magnitude of a potential loss that causes people to buy insurance voluntarily -- it is the frequency with which a loss is likely to occur. Perhaps that explains why government regulation fails to prevent unsafe behavior when the likelihood of being caught is low such as demonstrated by the FAA and their approach to Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) enforcement. This is particularly true if fame and fortune await the man who, against all odds, manages to pull it off without either losing money or getting caught.
So then why should more regulations, penalties and technology solutions such as geo-fencing be effective remedies? The traditional argument states that a sure way to reduce the risks associated with UAS operations in a geographic area is to simply close that particular airspace to all UAS traffic. In reality, UAS operators will simply move to other locations and the risk will migrate with them therefore airspace closure is no effective remedy. To believe otherwise would be falling victim to the theory that damming the river will prevent it from flowing to the sea.
The emergence of the unmanned aircraft industry makes this the perfect time to question those traditional safety and accident prevention practices. Specifically, it could be argued that the traditional reliance on enforcement of laws, on informing the public of certain dangers, and on engineering the physical features of the human-made environment is not very effective in promoting a culture of safety since these are dependent upon human conduct.
Arguing against traditional practices may appear to be a negative approach to safety, but nothing could be further from the truth. The limited success of traditional practices also points the way to design more effective UAS safety programs. Not surprisingly, these alternative approaches are aimed at increasing people’s desire to be safe and to reduce exposure to risk rather than increasing their fear of being caught. Thus, as an alternative to the enforcement, educational, and engineering approaches of the past, developing a culture of safety will be the best way to proceed with UAS regulation and integration.
At least once a week, we are called by some manufacturer or startup executive telling us that all that is needed to dramatically alter human nature and improve UAS safety, is for the insurance industry to require the use of their product or service. This suggests that those hopeful executives have, once again, fallen under the assumption that the purpose of insurance is to increase safety. What they fail to recognize is that insurance companies are not philanthropists or safety agencies, but commercial risk takers for hire. Imagine the conflicted underwriter responding to undeniable proof that the executive’s new invention would make UAS virtually uncrashable or ships unsinkable.
While insurance companies can provide incentive to operate safely, that incentive must be greater than the benefit of risk. When the perceived loss from risky operations outweighs the perceived benefits of safety, then we will have turned the corner on developing a culture of safety.