half later , 17,300 Kosovars were still displaced within Kosovo , with 220,000 displaced in Montenegro and Serbia .
One factor affecting the return of these displaced people was the security situation : “ most of those who said they wished to stay in Serbia cited fear for their safety after return , their property being destroyed and a worry that their freedom of movement would be restricted as reasons for not wanting to return ,” ( Derks- Normandin , p . 8 ). After the initial conflict , two different police initiatives emerged to address such security concerns in Kosovo : 1 ) UNMIK instituted 4500 CIVPOL police troops , and 2 ) UNMIK built up the Kosovo Police Service ( KPS ) in order to hand security tasks over to the local police as soon as possible . Additionally , a “ lightly armed civilian force with an emergency response and a humanitarian mandate ” was created , called the Kosovo Protection Corps ( KPC ), ( Derks- Normandin , p . i ). The KPC was formed mostly in order to appease the former Kosovo Liberation Army ( KLA ), which had been composed of Kosovo Albanians resisting Milosevic ’ s Serbians during the 1999 conflict .
One way in which Security Sector Reform in Kosovo contributed to durable solutions for the return of IDPs and refugees was through vetting security sector personnel in these institutions . The vetting of security personnel builds trust both by holding perpetrators accountable and by making it less likely that such acts will occur again in the future . From the beginning , the KPS instituted a rigorous vetting process to verify physical and psychological fitness for potential candidates as well as background checks on past behavior . It was agreed that 50 % of the Kosovo ’ s police ( the KPS ) would be formed from the KLA ; however , these ex-combatants had to go through the same application process as all other candidates to join the police . This made the KPS more legitimate , preventing criminal , corrupt , and abusive elements from entering the police , which boosted consistently high levels of trust reported . The KPC , on the other hand , had less success with trust-building . It was largely not trusted by Kosovo Serbs , since it was composed almost entirely of former KLA ( which had had a reputation of allegations of human rights abuses ). Years later , there was an additional vetting process which enabled some of the older former KLA to retire with dignity and make room for additional Kosovars to serve in what became the Kosovar Security Forces ( KSF ) – however , this institution was still treated with some suspicion , since it wasn ’ t as broadly representative from its beginnings .
In addition to vetting , inclusive representation in the security sector increases durable solutions for the return of conflict-displaced populations . In the creation of the Kosovo Police ( originally the Kosovo Police Service ), UNMIK placed high importance on including a broad representation of social groups within Kosovar society . The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ( OSCE ) was thus tasked to recruit and train ( with the assistance of CIVPOL ) a broadly inclusive police force . OSCE recruited actively , filling quotas of 15 % minority and 20 % female candidates . Ethnic representation as such is an important first step in building a legitimate security sector , but in a situation of protracted ethnic
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