SOLLIMS Sampler Special Edition | Page 41

In response to the crises in both 1999 and 2006 , multinational military forces deployed rapidly under a Chapter VII mandate , preventing additional displacement and stabilizing the situation , according to a case study by the Brookings Institute . Unfortunately , these initial efforts lacked sustainability in terms of durable solutions for displacement . Initial UN missions deemed land / property issues too complicated for transitional authority ; this oversight precipitated increased land use without titling , which directly contributed to the 2006 crisis . Overall , from the initial conflict in 1999 up until 2012 , Timor-Leste was host to a total of 5 different UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations ( DKPO ) missions as well as 2 multinational military forces . These included : UN Mission in East Timor ( UNAMET ) ( June 1999- Oct . 1999 ), International Force for East Timor ( INTERFET ) ( Sept . 1999 – March 2000 ), UN Transitional Administration in East Timor ( UNTAET ) ( Oct . 1999 – May 2002 ), UN Mission of Support to East Timor ( UNMISET ) ( May 2002 – May 2005 ), UN Office in Timor- Leste ( UNOTIL ) ( May 2005- Aug . 2006 ), International Stabilization Force ( ISF ) ( May 2006 – Nov . 2012 ), and UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste ( UNMIT ) ( Aug . 2006 – Dec . 2012 ).
After the initial crisis , UNTAET established a Commission for Reception , Truth and Reconciliation ( CAVR ) in 2002 to investigate crimes , primarily focusing on return / reconciliation from the 1999 violence . Although CAVR as a whole did not ultimately achieve accountability for crimes , CAVR spurred an initiative called the Community Reconciliation Process ( CRP ) which did become a success . The CRP used restorative justice through a traditional process called “ nahe biti bo ’ ot ,” which means “ spreading of the large mat ” in which customary authorities and elders would sit together on a mat to resolve and mediate conflicts ; the process had local ownership of an all-Timorese Commission , and over 1,400 CRP were supported by CAVR . In combination with the peacekeeping missions providing security , these processes played a large role in allowing displaced people to return . People who were pro-militia and pro-independence could now live beside each other without fear of reprisal , which let them focus on rebuilding their communities . Unfortunately , the CRPs were not used for many of the new arrivals in Dili , which increased tensions amidst land and resource competition . Furthermore , while many useful recommendations were formulated through the CAVR process , such as the need for ongoing mechanisms for community-level conflict resolution , these recommendations were not implemented within security sector reform or by the national government . This failure to incorporate the peacebuilding lessons and approaches within the security sector contributed to the eruption of conflict in 2006 . Actors were focused on separate siloes and did not coordinate simultaneously across the spectrum of activities .
After the 2 nd crisis , the government developed a National Recovery Strategy ( NRS ) in 2008 to resolve displacement based on consultations with IDPs which had shown the primary barriers to return to be land disputes , damaged homes , and fear . The government offered cash settlement of various amounts based on the extent of damage to IDP homes , and the majority of IDPs who accepted this
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