SBAND Seminar Materials DUI Case Law Update Materials | Page 11

Procedure: ND DOT suspended Painte’s license and the district court reversed
concluding the hearing officer made no specific finding of fact or conclusion of law
established that Painte was able to "manipulate the vehicle's controls" and the hearing
officer failed to articulate "any other nexus between her findings of fact and her
conclusions of law" or "to clearly explain how the findings of fact lead to the conclusions
of law. ND Supreme Court REVERSED.
Holding:
The Court may imply the necessary findings of fact if, after reviewing the
record, they are able to clearly understand the judicial referee's factual determinations.
When scrupulous compliance with the approved methods is not shown, the Department
must introduce expert testimony to establish fair administration of the test. The lab
analyst affidavit was sufficient for establishing prima facie evidence of her status as the
director’s designee and no such counter evidence exists.
Dissent: (Gerald W. VandeWalle) The plain language of N.D.C.C. § 39-20-07(7),
rather than supporting the taking of judicial notice, requires the certified records actually
be offered into evidence at the administrative hearing to be admitted as prima facie
evidence. Because such a listing of the director's designees is provided on the attorney
general's website, it would seemingly have been a simple matter to obtain the listing and
admit it into evidence.
4) Dawson v. ND DOT, 2013 ND 62, 830 N.W.2d 221
Prosecutor:
Defense:

Douglas Anderson
Justin Hager

Facts:
An officer was dispatched at approximately 3:15 p.m. to the scene where a
boat had fallen off a trailer being pulled by a vehicle and the driver did not stop. When he
arrived at the accident site the driver of the vehicle was not present. He drove to the west
and south of the accident site but did not find the driver. He also testified that he had not
been in the area prior to receiving the dispatch report. The officer received another call
from dispatch several minutes later stating the driver of the vehicle had returned to the
accident site. The officer returned to the accident site and spoke with Dawson who
admitted driving the vehicle, losing control, and going into the ditch. Dawson also
admitted consuming alcohol. Dawson's pickup was parked to the east of the accident site.
Dawson had parked his pickup and received a ride back to the accident site from one of
the witnesses via a four-wheeler. The officer interviewed several witnesses at
approximately 4:00 p.m., and they indicated to him that the accident happened within a
fifteen-minute window prior to the dispatch call, which occurred at approximately 3:10
p.m. Dawson objected to the admission of the witnesses' statements based on hearsay.
Procedure: The hearing officer allowed the witnesses statements concluding the
present sense impression and the excited utterance exceptions applied and subsequently
suspended Dawson. Dawson appealed to the district court and the court ruled the hearsay
should not have been allowed but the greater weight of the evidence established a

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