Popular Culture Review Vol. 23, No. 2, Summer 2012 | Page 37

Philosophical Reflections on the Age of Ephemera 33 sprung up (such as Pandora, which pushes music to you based on what you have already said you like). More will follow: we will comport ourselves to the new world. A similar problem confronts users of the new communications technologies. Used to the letter-like formalities of email exchange, I have asked my son how one ought to end an instant message exchange. It seems wrong simply to stop responding to a communicative act, even if the last act was the barest “LOL.” Disposable Me The overabundance of media has had unexpected consequences, not just for the publishing industry or the movie or music industries, but for the meaning of ownership itself and for the person who would have owned before but who now accesses. We can see this in a general way: several generations grew up with a defining collection of non-ephemeral, non-digital materials: books, LPs, VHS and even DVD movies (for a time). Crates of materials were U-Hauled from one phase of life to another, because, in a very personal sense, they delimited a continuous person and an historical passage of the continuous person through time. Here is a dramatic life change, and yet this is the person who liked R.E.M. before R.E.M. was cool; or this is the hedge fund manager who, years after college, still has a copy of Das Kapital on her bookshelf for her guests to see and note. A choice to own one album or book over another, of course, was a material decision of some consequence. Psychologists tell us that ownership serves several psychological functions, including the competing functions of socialization and individuation.20 Put another way, we buy what we are expected to buy because we want to meet the expectations of others; and we buy what we are not expected to buy because we want to “be ourselves.” The suggestion is that ownership is outward-looking, so to speak: it is a representation of the self, primarily directed toward others. This is surely true, and yet the notion of an ego that is fully formed, making ownership decisions in light of a careful evaluation of what others will think, is suspect. We want and we are the one who wants simultaneously. We do not like Led Zeppelin because we see that others like Led Zeppelin; we like Led Zeppelin, like others who also like Led Zeppelin, are liked by others who also like Led Zeppelin, like Led Zeppelin all the more for it, and so on. As time passes there is a stickiness to this “liking Led Zeppelin.” It is difficult—though, tellingly, not impossible—to stop liking Led Zeppelin. This is our immediate experience, and Husserl puts it more formally: we take stances or positions in the world.21 We attend to this, we ignore that; we like cats but not dogs; we are happy to see him but we despise her. The positions we take give shape to the world as a world for us—we bring meaning into it. Thus for Husserl, while the location of trees and roads and the height of tables and the distance to the nearest gas station are more or less fixed for us, the world is nevertheless constituted to some extent by our personal stances. It’s hot and I