Popular Culture Review Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2003 | Page 30

26 Popular Culture Review Ultimately, the coup de grace was administered to Project Kingfish in a Feb ruary 2, 1967 memorandum from Leonard Marks, USIA director, to President Johnson, stressing that the Agency should not be involved in covert operations that were more the domain of the CIA. If revealed, Marks argued, sponsorship of the newsreel “could be used by foreign powers to disparage our information efforts and to label USIA as a covert organization. Needless to say, such accusations could ... result in censorship and rigid control of our activities.” The covert Kingfish operation ended with Marks urging movie companies to operate the newsreel un der private auspices and to secure funding from other sources (Marks, 1967, 1). Assessing the propagandistic effectiveness of Kingfish proves difficult be cause of inconsistent field reporting of newsreel usage by target audiences. Ac cording to Bogart (1995), “Propaganda is an art requiring special talent. It is not mechanical, scientific work. Influencing attitudes requires experience, area knowl edge, and instinctive judgment of what is the best argument for the audience” (195-196). Certainly, the USIA appeared fractured in its debate over policy con tent, with no consensus reached on amount, frequency, or what material was more appropriate for which audience. This lack of a consensus also seems to fall short of Terence H. Quaker’s assessment of what constitutes effective propaganda: “[it] must be seen, remembered, understood, and acted upon, adapted to particular needs of the situation and the audience to which it is aimed” (1962, xii). Interestingly, the “particular needs” component of Quaker’s definition seems to support the position of the USIA officials who called for the newsreels to be used only during times of crisis. Meanwhile, Jowett and O’Donnell weigh in with their definition of propa ganda, stating that it is “the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape percep tions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that fur thers the desired intent of the propagandist” (1986,16). While certainly the history of the rise and fall of Project Kingfish attests to the deliberative attempt to mold American propaganda as a weapon during the Cold War, the evidence indicates that the “desired intent” of the USIA had not been achieved by the clandestine project. Arizona State University Dennis Russell and Richard Lentz Works Cited Barrett, Edward W. (1953). Truth Is Our Weapon. New York: Funk and Wagnall’s. Bogart, Leo. (1995). Cool Words, Cold War: A New Look at USIA’s Premises fo r Propaganda. Washington, D.C.: American University Press. Dizard, Wilson P. (1961). The Strategy o f Truth: The Story o f the U.S. Information Service. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press. Fielding, Raymond. (1972). The American Newsreel, 1951-1967. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.