a viable and stable government , and whose security enhance would have a direct impact on U . S . national interests .
Based on detailed discussions between this experienced group of practitioners and researchers , WG 4 strongly believed the following considerations must be incorporated into policy , strategy , doctrine , training , education , and exercises to enable the U . S . to better conduct SFA-type missions :
-Conduct a thorough assessments of the PN ’ s most effective practices in safety , public security , and justice , and develop around those existing capabilities , while also taking into consideration the second and third order effects of any SFA development initiative .
-Incorporate as many different perspectives as possible in the planning for SFA missions , especially from disenfranchised groups ( e . g ., increase diversity to include women , different ethnic groups , and social / psychological / anthropological professionals ). There must be demographic appropriateness ; the approach must be inclusive of all interested stakeholders .
-Legitimacy must be contextualized to local and regional norms , i . e ., identify the historical / sociopolitical nuances of the society ; learn the PN ’ s “ experience of justice ;” develop / enhance their systems of accountability , i . e ., transparency , accountability , and oversight ( TAO ). The concept of legitimacy can be greatly accelerated by introducing rule of law and human rights early in the process , and by ensuring unity of command for all SFA missions with the understanding that each development initiative effects all other programs .
-Take into account the diversity of tempo / synchronization of development between echelons of command , and between the levels of assistance being provided to the partner nation , i . e ., between the Executive , Generating , and Operating ( E-G-O ) functions . There must be symbiotic relationships and communication feedback loops between the Executive / Generating / Operating functions as well the Strategic / Operational / Tactical levels .
-Develop and initiate the PN ’ s approach to vetting their internal security forces , and establish guidelines for reconciling or prosecuting security force members involved in crimes against the populace . The PN must consider whether justice development is a viable option , or maybe a “ justice and reconciliation commission ” that exposes atrocities is more appropriate .
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