Military Review English Edition May-June 2014 | Page 90

BOOK REVIEWS of-fact in describing his job—he killed the enemy to protect his fellow sailors, soldiers, and marines. The book has shortcomings, though they are minor and understandable. The author speaks little about sniper tactics, techniques, and procedures for obvious reasons, yet discussion of these intricacies would greatly interest most readers. Most descriptions are generic. The unit made contact, an insurgent appeared, and Kyle delivered the killing shot. There is little in the way of psychology except for a short discussion on the challenge of the first kill and how some snipers experience slumps. Many readers might wonder why a person would wish to be a sniper or what makes a sniper different from other close combat warriors. As for tactics, how does a sniper gain the edge when dueling with an enemy sniper? Discussion of tactics is minimal. Kyle’s opinions on how recent wars have been fought make the book interesting and relevant. Though he does not belabor these points, he offers insight into the mind of the warrior in direct contact with the enemy. For example, he wholly disagreed with “putting an Iraqi face on the war,” claiming that the idea was “garbage.” He believed that training the Iraqi force while trying to win was preposterous, that the United States should first win the war and then worry about training the host-nation forces. Presumably, he is not alone in that viewpoint. Further, Kyle seemed to think little of winning hearts and minds; he maintained that cooperation occurred in Ramadi only after U.S. forces had killed massive numbers of combatants. Once it was clear U.S. forces “meant business,” the tribal leaders threw out the insurgents and cooperated. Kyle suggests that the United States could have killed its way to victory. This is an interesting point and worthy of consideration. Many strategic leaders repeat the claim that such an approach cannot succeed. Yet, if the soldiers on the ground disagree, we have at a minimum a failure to create shared understanding—a requirement for successful mission command. Despite the book’s limitations, Kyle tells an interesting and important story. He is honest and self-effacing, candidly discussing marital challenges, the stress of his divided loyalty between family and SEAL team, and his daughter’s health scare. His point of view, one seen through a high-power scope mounted on a .300 Winchester Magnum rifle, comes across clearly. To use Chris Kyle’s famous motto, 88 “Despite what your mamma told you, violence does solve problems.” Lt. Col. Jim Varner, U.S. Army, Retired, Platte City, Missouri BROTHERS AT WAR: The Unending Conflict in Korea Sheila Miyoshi Jager, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 2013, 605 pages F UTURE HISTORIANS MAY one day recall the Korean War as the world’s longest, strangest conflict. In Brothers at War, Sheila Miyoshi Jager recounts seven decades of bloodshed on the Korean Peninsula. She begins with the brutal civil war that followed World War II and continues through the North Korean invasion of 1950 and the three subsequent years of open warfare. She concludes with the current standoff between the brutal and unpredictable regime in Pyongyang and its uneasy neighbors, most notably the prosperous Republic of Korea. The author, a professor of East Asian studies at Oberlin College, focuses the first half of her study on the devastating conflict between United Nations and communist forces. Jager’s version briefly summarizes the war’s key military actions. She incorporates keen observations on the political and cultural aspects of the war, particularly its waning U.S. support, the lengthy and frustrating cease-fire negotiations, and the difficult relationship between Korean premier Syngman Rhee and his United Nations allies. These are familiar topics to Western scholars and history buffs. However, Jager also examines many of the war’s less publicized issues, such as the plight of South Korean civilians hastily drafted and thrown into combat with U.S. units, the alleged war crimes by both sides, the mistreatment of prisoners of war, and the increasing role of South Korean military forces during the course of the war. Delegates finally agreed to a cease-fire in July 1953, formally ending hostilities between communist and United Nations forces on the Korean peninsula. As Jager illustrates, the 60-year-old cease-fire has proven anything but peaceful. Subsequent decades have been marked by a seemingly endless series of bellicose and occasionally bloody incursions by the North Korean May-June 2014 MILITARY REVIEW