Military Review English Edition May-June 2014 | Page 68

In El Salvador, the national campaign plan was
largely the product of the U.S. embassy in San
Salvador. In Colombia, the idea of the Plan
Colombia was presented as early as 1998 to the
Clinton administration. The support began in 2000
as an effort to stabilize Colombia with foreign
military sales and Andean counterdrug initiative
money. Funding from 2000 through 2010 for all
types of support came to over $7 billion.17 The
original 1990s plan, Plan Colombia, has given way
to a new initiative under the current Colombian
administration, the National Consolidation Plan,
and the Colombian government created a cabinetlevel Center for Coordinated Integrated Action in
2004. The center was instrumental in integrating
the overall efforts of the Colombian government
(military, police, political, and economic) to consolidate gains made in the COIN effort against the
FARC.18 In the Philippines, various programs such
as the Peace and Order Council and the Council
for Peace and Development were created by the
Philippine government to coordinate national,
provincial, and lower-level development plans.
These have proven effective at implementing the
security and civil reforms needed to bring the
insurgency to an end.19
The U.S. Congress has mandated constraints
on the scope of U.S. military activities in all three
countries. In Colombia, U.S. military involvement
began in 2000 and was limited to training Colombian counternarcotics units, although U.S. forces
now train the Colombian military in COIN operations.20 About 200 special forces soldiers work in
Colombia, where they are limited to training in
garrison, and planning and intelligence support
at headquarters.21 U.S. forces do not accompany
or serve as advisors to Colombian units conducting combat operations. In the Philippines, U.S.
military operations are limited by the Philippine
constitution. Foreign military forces are not permitted to participate in combat operations on Philippine territory. The U.S military is restricted to
conducting training in COIN and counterterrorism
tactics, advising Philippine units, and participating
in civil-military operations.22
The Joint Combined Exchange Training conducted under Section 2011 of Title 10, United
States Code; theater security cooperation plans;
and the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and
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Civic Aid program, have provided a stable
platform for unified U.S. government efforts in
Colombia and the Philippines. The Joint Combined
Exchange Training exercises with friendly foreign
militaries are conducted ostensibly for training
U.S. special operations forces. Humanitarian assistance programs such as medical and veterinary

Force caps reflect congressional and public reluctance to
allow the military to expand conflicts by introducing ever-greater
numbers of troops.
visits may be added to cultivate goodwill among
local populations and as part of the training for
foreign troops.
In 2006, Congress authorized a new “global
train and equip” fund and has renewed it every
year since.23 Section 1206 of Public Law 109-163
provides the first major DOD authority to be used
expressly for the purpose of training and equipping the national military forces of foreign countries. For the past half-century, DOD has trained
and equipped foreign military forces under State
Department Title 22 authority and through State
Department programs. While there are some congressional misgivings with this blurring of State
Department and DOD boundaries, combatant commanders consider the Section 1206 program “the
single most important tool for the Department to
shape the environment and counter terrorism.”24
This authority allows USSOCOM to train and
equip foreign military forces and foreign maritime
security forces to perform counterterrorism operations and to participate in or support military and
stability operations with the United States.25 It has
been used in Colombia, the Philippines, and even
the Arabian Peninsula.
Congress also placed limits on the number of
personnel in country, called force caps. Force
caps reflect congressional and public reluctance
to allow the military to expand conflicts by
introducing ever-greater numbers of troops. In El
May-June 2014

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