Military Review English Edition May-June 2014 | Page 50

warfare theory is designed to change the perspective
about the military use of IT from a platform-centric
focus, in which an item of equipment is the centerpiece, to a network-centric focus based on the four
domains of conflict.40 The theory can be applied to
any type of military operation—offense, defense, or
stability. Furthermore, the idea of network-centric
warfare should not be confused with improved
speed of command due to better technology, which
is a platform-centric notion.
The Army continues to focus on individual
equipment as it attempts to digitize operations by
introducing more digital technology components
rather than unifying how leaders think and fight in
the digital space.41 This leads to capabilities being
overlooked. Military technology has advanced to
the point that information superiority has been possible for some time.
Some military organizations already have devised
means to achieve seamless interservice integration
between their combat capabilities. For example,
some Army and Air Force units in Afghanistan
have integrated their systems (the Army’s ABCS,
Air Force aircraft systems, and unmanned aerial
systems [UASs]) so that pilots and infantrymen can
have almost perfect awareness of each other’s positions before a fighter aircraft arrives on station.42
The technology enables leaders to make faster and
more informed assessments of the environment
before applying coup d’œil and determination.
Unfortunately, few leaders recognize the potential
that such capability affords soldiers so it remains
underutilized.43

Applied Network-Centric Warfare
Theory

Two vignettes from my experience in Afghanistan during 2009 demonstrate the application of
network-centric warfare theory.
Vignette 1. Task Force (TF) Stryker, a Stryker
BCT, had recently arrived in Afghanistan and
started conducting operations in early August
2009. During the first major offensive mission,
TF Stryker elements observed a group of Taliban
mining a road at approximately 1900 hours on 1
September 2009 and attacked them with aerial
munitions from a UAS.44 The TF Stryker command group, consisting of the commander and
assault command post personnel from the brigade
48

battle staff, were forward at a small combat outpost. The command group observed the attack
and commanded follow-on operations from the
outpost. The enemy, after the attack, evacuated
casualties to an intermediate point, massed additional personnel, and continued to evacuate the
most seriously injured to an outpost—a Canadianadvised Afghan police element across the river
and outside TF Stryker’s area of operations,
which provided the highest-quality medical care
available. The wounded Taliban were identified
by 2100 hours, and the Afghan National Security
Forces assumed responsibility for their medical
care.45
Analysis of vignette 1. The command group
relied on a variety of computing devices and
multimedia data streams to observe enemy tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in real time.
The command group’s equipment included video,
Internet chat, radio (digital) voice communication,
VoIP (voice over Internet protocol), laptop PCs,
position location data, FBCB2, and Land Warrior
(a ruggedized wearable computer for infantrymen).46 B V6W6RF