Military Review English Edition May-June 2014 | Page 37

BEYOND COCAINE COWBOYS

Former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Adm. Michael Mullen stated, “The most significant threat to our national security is our
debt.”4 Consistent with this true statement, U.S.
security policy has a vital role in improving the
economic prosperity of our nation. As “the third
pillar of the West, alongside Europe and North
America,” Latin America can have a significant
economic effect on the United States.5 Cultural
ties with the region are rapidly strengthening;
U.S. Latinos are expected to make up a third
of the population by 2050.6 The United States
may find itself with more Spanish speakers than
any other country. Economic opportunities are
remarkable; last year, U.S. trade with the region
exceeded $700 billion.7 The population of Latin
America is nearly 600 million, roughly half
the population of China.8 Geo-strategist Parag
Khanna makes a powerful argument for a U.S.
focus not on Asia, but rather on Latin America.
He argues persuasively that by increasing commerce with Latin America, the United States
can significantly boost economic prosperity in
the hemisphere.9 The diplomatic and economic
elements of national power are already deeply
involved in development, but these initiatives
will be stymied in the absence of a matching
military and law enforcement effort.
If the United States is to pursue a more robust
policy toward increasing our economic partnerships with Latin American countries, the security
of their citizens will be a prerequisite. One need
only look to Colombia to see the importance of
security in economic development. A decade
of successful security policies under presidents
Alvaro Uribe and Juan Manuel Santos have
reduced the number of Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia members by half. Colombia’s
focus on “democratic security” has delivered
positive results in virtually every measure of
citizen security: kidnappings declined 89 percent,
homicides 49 percent, and terrorist attacks 66
percent.10 As a result, Colombia’s gross domestic product averaged a 4.54 percent growth rate
from 2002 to 2012, increasing by $244 billion.11
The U.S. role in Colombia’s success was driven
mainly by Plan Colombia counterdrug funding.
However, not all destabilizing forces in the region
fit into the drug trafficking mold.
MILITARY REVIEW

May-June 2014

Powerful criminal gangs are a serious problem
throughout the region and especially in Central
America. The most dangerous criminal gangs,
often referred to as “third-generation gangs,”
are militarized criminal groups that use guerrilla
or rudimentary light-infantry tactics against the
state.12 These groups often engage in retail drug
sales but do not reach the transnational level that
would invite significant U.S. counterdrug interventions; yet, their impact on citizen security is
tremendous. It is estimated that crime costs almost

The Darien region of Panama
remains so remote and outside
of government control that the
Pan-American Highway has yet
to bridge the complex terrain.

eight percent of Central America’s gross domestic
product, some $20 billion.13 Perhaps worse is the
loss of untold amounts of foreign direct investment that goes to safer locales.
Stability and security are crucial for developing
extensive hemispheric economic infrastructure.
Criminal groups limit the free flow of commerce,
engaging in illegal taxation and extortion in cities,
seaports, airports, and highways. The Darien
region of Panama remains so remote and outside
government control that the Pan-American Highway has yet to bridge the complex terrain. Given
the economic benefit this highway would have for
the region, it should be a priority for U.S. security
efforts. Moreover, pipelines, mining, electrical
grids, and other valuable economic infrastructure
are often the target of attack by criminal groups
and insurgents. Unfortunately, infrastructure
security is largely a secondary priority behind
counterdrug engagement. Security cooperation
will need to expand outside the limitations of its
current construction if stability is the overarching goal.
The need to contend with state threats and
border tensions often becomes secondary to the
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