Military Review English Edition March-April 2014 | Page 89
BOOK REVIEWS
proliferate on COIN. And yet, the causes and nature
of insurgency per se are seldom mentioned.”
Delving into this problem, the book’s first three
chapters examine the importance of grievances—
whether social, economic, or political—that engender insurgencies. However, solving such grievances
is beyond the realm of the military’s capability. The
author details how the military decision making
process is ill suited to resolve insurgent grievances
because it remains locked in a philosophical framework advocated by Antoine Jomini. The problem of
differing means and ends in combating insurgencies
shapes Lamborn’s argument throughout the book.
For example, he argues, “the U.S. Army has yet
to figure out that Jomini has no place in the graduate
school of warfare.”
In no way is Arms of Little Value a sardonic
critique of the U.S. military. The author makes an
effort to point out historical cases in which the United
States made wise decisions regarding its foreign
policy and use of its military. A consistent theme in
this regard is that success in countering insurgencies
has occurred where the United States supported host
governments that reformed the negative practices that
served as rationale for revolution. Insurgencies have
an emboldened cause where reform has not occurred,
as in the case of South Vietnam where Ngo Dinh
Diem exemplified failure as a leader. Conversely,
Magsaysay in the Philippines eventually overcame
the Hukbalahap insurgency because of his willingness to reform. In all cases, political legitimacy is key
and cannot be accomplished solely through military
power or inundating a country with development aid
unless real and perceived reform occurs. This issue
is still problematic for the United States.
Despite the astronomical investment by the American people in national security, the defense establishment has shown itself less than fully competent at
dealing with low-intensity conflict—insurgency. The
answer to this failure is straightforward: the political
roots of warfare have been forgotten.
This contentious claim applies to the institutional
organization and pathos of the military. Notably,
Lamborn cites the expertise of several contemporary
generals such as Stanley McChrystal as exceptions.
A troubling argument, one central to the book, is the
inability of the U.S. military to truly adapt into an
organization that teaches and understands the political foundations of insurgency, despite its publicized
MILITARY REVIEW
March-April 2014
statements that it is an evolving and “adaptable”
force.
Lamborn recognizes that the U.S. military has
been handed politically oriented tasks for which it
is not organized, and he drives home the point that
other departments must shoulder a greater share.
Emphasizing conventional exercises and training
officers how to plan static defenses, for example, are
understandable but obviously ill-suited to address an
insurgency. The author argues that this is a myopic
approach and that our military has yet to get its
institutional arms around political warfare embodied
through insurgency. This is important to fix, Lamborn argues, since political warfare in the form of
insurgencies will constitute the type of warfare most
likely to occur in the