Military Review English Edition March-April 2014 | Page 87
BOOK REVIEWS
Germans held the initiative throughout this period.
However, in cases of historical disagreement, the
authors seem to accept the German account as being
more reliable than the Soviet. Thus, for example,
they downplay the 1 October battle at Mtsensk—
famous in Soviet accounts as a significant victory
over German armor—as a small engagement that
only cost the Germans six tanks.
Despite such discrepancies, this is an excellent
book—well researched, fast paced, and enjoyable
to read. Both historians and general readers will
profit from reading it.
Col. Jonathan M. House, USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
WHY PEACE FAILS:
The Causes and Prevention of
Civil War Recurrence
Charles T. Call, Georgetown University Press
Washington, DC, 2012, 328 pages, $32.95
C
HARLES T. CALL, assistant professor of
international studies at American University,
sets out to determine why post-civil war peace
works in some cases but not in others. His investigation is rooted in conflict theory. He applies quantitative (linear regression) and qualitative analysis to
42 contemporary country case studies—27 cases
where post-civil war peace held and 15 cases where
it failed—to make numerous notable findings that
significantly advance the body of knowledge in
conflict theory.
Call’s central finding is that political exclusion of
opposition groups, rather than economic or social
factors, largely determines whether civil wars recur.
In other words, inclusionary behavior (power sharing)
closely corresponds with successful peace building. Eighty-five percent of cases with inclusionary
approaches resulted in sustained peace. His finding
also points to the critical role played by national actors
in determining success or failure of post-conflict
peace. National actors who consolidated power at the
expense of social groups associated with a conflict
ultimately led to the recurrence of civil war. He also
challenges the widely accepted view that economics
MILITARY REVIEW
March-April 2014
is the first factor to address in establishing enduring
post-civil war peace.
Call’s investigation further uncovers the critical
role international actors play in promoting inclusionary solutions to conflict and the instrumental role
third-party militaries can play in stabilizing situations. He also reveals that no single factor accounts
for success in consolidating peace and preventing the
re-igniting of civil war. Finally, he debunks the notion
that capacity building is more critical to securing
peace than the legitimacy of those in power.
The author discloses that exclusionary behavior
does not in all cases lead to recurrence of civil war.
In fact, this is true in 4 of the 15 cases he analyzes.
Because of the circumstances behind these exceptions, the fundamental outcomes of his exhaustive
research are not diminished.
Why Peace Fails sheds new light on variables that
most positively influence enduring post-civil war
peace, as well as the underlying causes of civil conflict
that lead to civil war. Call cites sources that represent
the most credible scholarly and professional works
available. His research is rigorous, comprehensive,
and compelling. It is well articulated and appropriately interwoven, with substantive depth and analysis.
His conclusions and recommendations are sound
and constructive. Moreover, they lend themselves
to productive debate and broadening research. This
is particularly true for those highlighting the need
for legitimacy of external actors in promoting peace
and the perseverance they must exude for peace to
endure. Why Peace Fails is a must-read for conflict
theory scholars, academics in the fields of political
science and international studies, and military and
government leaders—especially those who shape
U.S. policy with fragile states.
Lt. Col. David A. Anderson, Ph.D., USMC,
Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas
TURNING THE TIDE
Ed Offley
Basic Books, Perseus Books Group
New York, 478 pages, $28.99
E
D OFFLEY IS a former Naval officer with an
extensive background in military reporting.
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