Military Review English Edition March-April 2014 | Page 83

BOOK REVIEWS F E AT U R E D R E V I E W ISLANDS OF DESTINY: The Solomons Campaign and the Eclipse of the Rising Sun John Prados, NAL Caliber, 2012 388 pages, $26.95 D R. JOHN PRADOS challenges conventional wisdom in an engrossing new work on the Solomons Campaign in World War II’s Pacific Theater. Relying on intelligence sources as well as Japanese accounts, the author argues that the Solomons Campaign, and not the Battle of Midway as many historians suggest, represents the true decisive point that accorded the Allies an unmistakable advantage over their Japanese adversaries in terms of air and maritime superiority. This precipitated eventual Allied victory in the Pacific. While many accounts of the Solomons Campaign focus on the ground war and the desperate, compelling battles that ensued for control of islands such as Guadalcanal and their critical airfields, Prados concentrates on the vicious struggle for air and maritime superiority that was a corollary to permanent success on the ground. Here, the Imperial Japanese Navy was still a juggernaut, “down but not out” after its spectacular loss of four carriers during the battle of Midway in June 1942. The author shows that the Imperial Japanese Navy was more than a match for Allied naval forces, particularly early in the campaign and especially at night. The U.S. Navy suffered some of the worst defeats in its history during the Solomons Campaign; at the battle of Savo Island, for example, the Allies lost four heavy cruisers in a single, brief engagement. At one point during the campaign, the situation in the Pacific became so dire that the Navy was down to a single carrier in the entire theater—the USS Enterprise—and had to request the loan of the HMS Victorious from the British. MILITARY REVIEW March-April 2014 What turned the tide in favor of the Allies during the Solomons? Intelligence was foremost, according to Prados. The author successfully demonstrates that multiple sources—or pillars, as he refers to them— contributed to eventual Allied success. These included not only the efforts of the well-known cryptanalysts, or codebreakers, but also those of the invaluable coast watchers, radio traffic analysts, scouts, and indigenous persons who provided the Allies with the edge on enemy movements and intentions. However, as historian Sir John Keegan has shown, intelligence alone doesn’t guarantee victory—tactical execution still counts. The Allies were better able to incorporate the pillars of intelligence to decisive advantage. This explanation is one of Prados’s strengths, as he gives near-equal coverage to the Japanese viewpoint, incorporating Japanese accounts, combat diaries, and wartime message traffic. It is remarkable how similar both sides were in terms of the primacy of leadership personalities, interservice rivalries, and management of the war with shoestring resources. Another of the author’s obvious strengths is his seamless integration of multiple events across all levels of war—strategic, operational, and tactical. Readers will come away with a broad, holistic understanding of the Solomons Campaign, the strengths and weaknesses of the protagonists, and the role of intelligence as a precursor but not a guarantor of victory. Prados succeeds in making his case in this thought-provoking and highly readable effort. Mark Montesclaros, Fort Gordon, Georgia THE REVENGE OF GEOGRAPHY: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate Robert D. Kaplan, Random House, New York, 2012, $27.95, 428 pages R OBERT KAPLAN’S THE Revenge of Geography is a worthy addition to his body of 81