Military Review English Edition July-August 2014 | Page 92

The well-trained Japanese 14th Army, 65,000
strong, faced 150,000 U.S.-Filipino forces when the
Japanese invaded the Philippines. The Japanese landed their main force in the northwest, spearheaded by
the mechanized 48th Division (16,000 men), and sent
the 16th Division (7,000 men) to invade southeast of
Manila. Numerically, the U.S. and Filipino forces had
an overwhelming advantage. And the Americans had
more fighter aircraft based at Clark Field than the
Japanese used—why then, did they not hold?
Surprise was the major factor. Even though
the Americans had been warned of hostilities, the
Japanese attacked Clark Field around noontime, destroying 70 percent of the American fighters on the
ground. A second factor was MacArthur’s reticence
to send the bombers he did have against the Japanese
airfields in Formosa. After the Japanese surprise
attack, that option was no longer viable.
On the ground, 30,000 men comprised the
U.S.-Filipino main force—75,000 Filipinos were
organized in 10 Army divisions, but with significant
equipment challenges. An additional 45,000 were
in the constabulary and support units. War plans
called for a defense of Manila Bay. However, in the
weeks prior to the invasion, MacArthur successfully pushed for a more aggressive defense of all the
islands, intending to repel an attack on the coastline. This was a strategy that Lt. Col. Eisenhower,
MacArthur’s chief of staff in 1939, had previously
studied, and rejected—the forces available would not
be capable of executing it.
The destruction of U.S. air power at Clark Field,
and the withdrawal of the Asiatic Fleet made it easy
for Japanese advance parties to land. Recognizing
this, MacArthur quickly changed his strategy to the
prewar plans, which he had earlier criticized, and
directed a withdrawal from Manila to the Bataan
Peninsula. Maj. Gen. Wainwright, with 28,000 men,
opposed the Lingayan Gulf landings and delayed
the Japanese 10 days in their advance on Manila,
thus permitting the movement of 80,000 FilipinoAmerican troops and 26,000 civilians into Bataan.
Emphasis on this delaying action was later judged
“a tragic error.” More emphasis should have been
placed on the removal of munitions and provision
supplies to Bataan. This failure later haunted the
defenders and their ability to survive, without the
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means to do so. Filipino-American forces in Bataan
suffered more from disease, starvation, and lack of
munitions than actions in combat.
The Japanese, too, made a number of mistakes,
including operational-level miscalculations that cost
them heavily. The plan was to first destroy FilipinoAmerican forces, and then take Manila. The Japanese
continued to attack toward Manila, where they expected major opposition, even when intelligence indicated
the shift of forces to Bataan. They missed the opportunity to keep close contact with the enemy while it was
on the run. They occupied a major population center
(Manila), but did not achieve the more important goal
of destroying the enemy force.
The Japanese also miscalculated that the Americans
would not stop in Bataan, but continue their retreat
overseas. As 14th Army prepared to attack in Bataan, its
key units were withdrawn to other areas (Thailand and
the Dutch East Indies). The remaining forces, thinking
they faced an almost defeated enemy, were repulsed
with 25 percent casualties, including heavy leadership
losses. The Japanese were forced to suspend the campaign until the arrival of substantial reinforcements.
The Philippines was a costly investment for the
Japanese army. Masuda notes that by 1945, the
scale and intensity of the Japanese investment in the
Philippines was massive: 631,000 Japanese soldiers
fought there, suffering 498,000 (79 percent) killed in
action or death due to starvation or disease. By the
war’s end, this represented 20 percent of their total
losses in the Pacific war.
The surrender of the Japanese government in
September 1945 ended the fighting, but left the Allies
with an unprecedented challenge: the demobilization
and disarmament of seven million men organized in
154 Japanese army divisions. This was a far-greater
challenge than that faced in Germany, where most
organized military forces were already destroyed. There
were 2.5 million Japanese soldiers (57 divisions) in
Japan, where only two and a half U.S. divisions were
tasked to demobilize them.
Masuda captures the essence of what MacArthur
and his key staff members did during the occupation of
Japan through MacArthur’s relief in April 195 ĸ)5