Military Review English Edition July-August 2014 | Page 53
STRATEGIC SUCCESS
Military victory merely sets the conditions for the
transformative social and political order that come
after the guns go quiet. For better or worse, the job of
winning the victory always falls to the military. There
are not, nor have there ever been, State Department
divisions parachuting in to do the “political” work of
securing the victory. This is a false dichotomy. War is
political work. Militaries—armies especially—are tools
used to do the fundamental work of politics. They use
force to determine which side gets to decide the key
questions of social and political order when the normal
structures for determining order have ceased to work.
War demands a qualitative mindset because war
is a social phenomenon. Military commanders need
to understand politics in a deep and systematic way if
they are to ensure military force is a successful strategic
tool. They need to think strategically about the ultimate aims the force under their control will support.
The way to do this is to begin to think in context, to put
the role of force in context with the other variables on
the battlefield. To think in context systematically, commanders need to buttress their ability to think qualitatively and use the methods of social science to approach
military questions.
Strategic thinking involves evaluating “political,
economic, psychological, and military forces [i.e., influences]” to ensure military operations support national
policies.1 These types of “forces” have a common characteristic: they do not lend themselves to quantitative
analysis. Army professionals who wish to practice
strategic thinking will need to adopt a qualitative
approach to evaluating such factors. This is more easily
said than done because qualitative analysis is unnatural
to Army culture.
The study of political science, economics, psychology,
and military science requires grounding in qualitative
social science methodology. While this methodology is
essential to effective strategic thinking, it is contrary to
the Army’s dominant professional culture. Army culture
prefers a techno-scientific, quantitative, and predictive
approach based on mathematical-type analysis; that
approach cannot provide an accurate understanding of
strategic issues, let alone predict outcomes of military
operations with anything close to certainty.
Contemporary social science studies social phenomena in terms of interdependent—rather than independent and dependent—variables. For phenomena that
MILITARY REVIEW July-August 2014
are made up of interdependent variables—phenomena such as war—establishing clear cause-and-effect
theories is frustrating even for social scientists accustomed to that type of research. In fact, interdependent
variables make predictions of the hard-science type impossible. This does not mean, however, that qualitative
approaches should be dismissed. Rather, understanding
the value and limitations of qualitative methods is
crucial for a profession tasked with using force to create
qualitative sociopolitical end states.
What is the Problem?
Quantitative approaches work best when researchers can isolate individual problems and when
relationships are hierarchical. A complex military
problem, such as “how do we invade Region X and
establish security?” provides a simplified example. The
problem-solving process typically used is quantitative
and predictive. It starts with a defined highest-order
problem (invading Region X and establishing security)
and breaks it down into smaller problems such as—
How would we get there?
How long would a trip by boat or plane take?
How many weapons and supplies would we need?
What kind of weapons and supplies would we need?
A reductive approach is then used along with the
analytical tools of mathematics and statistics in a repeating process until a series of answers can be summed
together to solve the original problem.
Strategic probl ems, on the other hand, are not really
“problems” at all; they are metaproblems. Strategic questions ask about intent and values; they are questions
about choosing an explanatory framework to use when
addressing problems of application. Strategic problems
have only qualitative answers. Rather than ask, “How do
we invade Region X,” a strategic question seeks to understand why or whether invading Region X would indeed
help achieve larger goals and whether its negative ripple
effects over time might outweigh its short-term benefits.
Strategic questions are first-order questions:
Should we invade Region X, considering all the
potential consequences?
What would we expect an invasion to achieve?
In what other ways could we achieve our goals
(e.g., such as by bombing alone)?
Should we also seek the dissolution of the region’s
monarchy or ruling system?2
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
51