Military Review English Edition January-February 2017 | Page 91

DIGITAL LETHALITY

integration of the complete mission command system.
The digital crews improved significantly at CP setup,
which enhanced digital integration and promoted better synchronization across warfighting functions. The
main and tactical CPs both saw significant refinement
as the training and CPXs progressed. Changes based
on these improvements were codified in SOP updates
and incorporated into later digital gunnery events and
subsequent exercises.
Personnel turnover was a significant issue at the
division level, but engaged leadership helped enforce
stabilization. For situations where stabilization was
not possible, the digital gunnery plan incorporated
retraining events after each exercise that provided
opportunities to update crews on new SOPs as well as
to integrate new members.
Additionally, not all members of the CP that operated an MCIS were able to participate in the training.
To combat this shortfall, future iterations of 1ID’s digital gunnery program will have a stand-alone training
event for leaders that use CPOF but are not necessarily
a part of a crew. This event will give individuals like the
division chief of staff or the G-3 (operations officer) a
refresher on CPOF and CP SOPs to ensure they have
the necessary skill set to effectively operate and lead in
the CP. This training will take no longer than ninety
minutes, but it will give leaders the depth of understanding to execute and improve the unit’s digital SOPs.
The investment of sending soldiers to the
MCDMG course and spending the time to train on
the digital tables significantly improved the unit’s ability to support mission command. This digital proficiency translated directly to lethality, as the division was
able to maintain synchronization with faster coordination and increased collaboration. All echelons benefited from an increased shared understanding facilitated
by digital crew proficiency.
Two events during the WFX clearly showed the impact made by MCDMGs and the digital gunnery tables.
First, the training enabled the division to jump (relocate)
the main CP twenty-four hours earlier than scheduled.
Digital crews were able to transfer portions of the their
tasks to the crews in the tactical CP, sustainment area
CP, and division artillery CP. MCIS operators ensured
their counterparts had the right information and permissions to continue the fight. Personnel in the main CP
were then able to disassemble their systems, conduct a
MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2017

tactical movement, and reestablish connectivity within
fourteen hours. During, this time, the fight continued as
planned, even with the tactical CP losing 50 percent of
their personnel in an attack.
Second, the division’s ability to rapidly execute
branch plans was facilitated by the cohesion of digital
crews. The commander quickly published mission orders
with effective graphics and other digital products. CPs
were able to more rapidly receive, confirm, and then
execute these plans thanks to the rapid coordination and
collaboration that came with increased digital lethality.

Conclusion
The proficiency necessary to integrate, operate, and
maintain today’s Army mission command information
systems requires command emphasis, continuous use,
and a digital sustainment training plan. The digital gunnery tables developed by the MCCoE and operationalized by the 1ID are exactly the type of training program
the Army needs. Flexible enough to integrate into the
division’s already planned schedule, they can be added
to a battalion or brigade’s training program. The digital gunnery tables—with qualified MCDMGs to lead
them—provide the framework for developing digital
lethality alongside the physically lethal systems.
CPX 1, completed before the tables, gave the 1ID a
baseline and started the digital gunnery process with
the goal of creating highly proficient CPs that used
digital lethality to dominate during a culminating WFX.
The progression from CPX 1 through the exercise was
remarkable. Operators went from using their systems in
independent but disjointed efforts, to creating specific
digital products, to working in collaboration with other
functions to create a truly integrated COP.
During the midpoint after-action review, MCTP
observers highlighted the hard work the division had
done to prepare for the exercise Specifically, they
emphasized the use and placement of MCDMGs as
something that truly set the conditions for success. The
digital gunnery tables created an environment where
system operators stopped going to the G-6 (communications and network management) with MCIS questions; instead, they called on their section’s MCDMGs,
or soldiers who had completed digital gunnery, for
assistance. The MCDMGs not only assisted in creating
better digital products, but they also freed up the G-6
team to focus on a very robust cyber threat.
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