expertise and to develop the critical and creative thinking skills they will need for any mission . As masters of their craft , they can pass their knowledge on to units in their next assignments and to partner forces .
Opportunistic units are fleeting . The Army personnel assignment process does not reward leaders who take time to build a team capable of sharing understanding and displaying disciplined initiative , adaptability , and innovation . Within thirty days of the conclusion of the 1ID ’ s WFX , the majority of the field-grade and senior company-grade leaders on the staff moved to the brigades to take key developmental positions or moved to other installations . The 1ID used the WFX as a venue for leader development and , in the process , it developed junior leaders who would spread the opportunistic mindset throughout the division and the Army for many years to come .
This meant that the division headquarters had to immediately plan for another intensive training cycle to bring new staff members on board after the summer transition period . Including senior NCOs and junior company-grade officers in the battle-staff teams insulated the division from a wholesale loss of knowledge during personnel turnover , but it remains to be seen if the Sustainable Readiness Model will solve this persistent , Army-wide problem . 14 Thus , it is imperative to take personnel turnover into account when assigning key battle-staff positions . The 1ID spent considerable energy documenting its training for and execution of its WFX . The division staff recorded leadership-development program sessions and cataloged assessments and AARs for the command-post exercises and WFX . Such a complete record should allow new staff members to come on board with a limited amount of turbulence .
Building an opportunistic division is a hard , continuous process . No single exercise , however successful , signals the end of the quest for an innovative , agile , and adaptive unit . The processes described above worked to get a new staff fully engaged and ready for one of the most difficult exercises they would ever face . It trained a group of leaders on the complexity of the decisive-action fight and applied the concept of an opportunistic unit . The experience had a positive effect not only on the division staff but also on the subordinate brigades and sister divisions , as Big Red One alumni moved on to other assignments .
The Big Red One ’ s experiences during the warfighter exercise were consistent with its history . From the unit ’ s inception as part of the American Expeditionary Forces under then Gen . John J . “ Black Jack ” Pershing during World War I ; to its storied exploits in North Africa , Sicily , and on D-Day in France during World War II ; to its service in Vietnam under then Maj . Gen . William E . DePuy , who modeled the modern squad after his experiences as the commanding general of the Big Red One ; the 1ID provided the model for others to follow . The warfighter exercise gave the First Infantry Division the opportunity to evolve and to continue its legacy of leader development and innovation .
Notes
1 . U . S . Army Training and Doctrine Command ( TRADOC ) Regulation ( TR ) 350-50-3 , Mission Command Training Program ( Fort Eustis , VA : TRADOC , 23 June 2014 ), 10 .
2 . William Adler , “ Training Opportunistic Formations : Leading Transitions for the Brigade Combat Team ,” NTC Decisive Action Training Environment Newsletter 12-19 ( September 2012 ), 93 – 103 . The authors of this article credit William Adler for inspiring their “ opportunistic ” construct ; they adapted Adler ’ s term to their own purposes . 3 . Army Doctrine Reference Publication ( ADRP ) 6-0 , Mission Command ( Washington , DC : Government Publishing Office [ GPO ], 17 May 2012 ), 1-4 .
4 . TRADOC Pamphlet ( TP ) 525-3-1 , The U . S . Army Operating Concept : Win in a Complex World , 2020-2040 w / chg . 1 ( Fort Eustis , VA : TRADOC , 31 October 2014 ), iii . 5 . Ibid ., 16 . 6 . Jamie Crawford , “ Army Announces Force Reduction of 40,000 Troops ,” CNN Politics website , 9 July 2015 , accessed 7 September 2016 , http :// www . cnn . com / 2015 / 07 / 09 / politics / army-announces-force-reduction-40000-troops /.
7 . ADRP 6-0 , Mission Command , 2-3 . 8 . TR 350-50-3 , Mission Command Training Program , 7 . 9 . The six Army warfighting functions are mission command , movement and maneuver , intelligence , fires , sustainment , and protection . A digital master gunner is a subject-matter expert on mission-command information systems including the Command Post of the Future command-and-control system .
10 . ADRP 6-0 , Mission Command , v ; ADRP 5-0 , The Operations Process ( Washington , DC : U . S . GPO , May 2012 ), 1-3 – 1-7 .
11 . Secretary of the Army , Army Directive 2012-08 : Army Total Force Policy ( Washington , DC : Office of the Secretary of the Army , 4 September 2012 ).
12 . Army Techniques Publication 3-91 , Division Operations ( Washington , DC : U . S . GPO , 17 October 2014 ), 1-1 .
13 . ADRP 3-0 , Unified Land Operations ( Washington , DC : U . S . GPO , 16 May 2012 ), 1-9 .
14 . “ Army Readiness Guidance ,” U . S . Army Stand-To ! website , 19 May 2016 , accessed 8 September 2016 , https :// www . army . mil / standto / 2016-05-19 .
84 January-February 2017
MILITARY REVIEW