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of combat power in the division ’ s primary echelon for water-crossing operations .
The use of the CAB as a higher headquarters for the advance guard was challenging . Within its organic organization , the CAB staff lacks a robust intelligence-and-fires section , and the CAB does not have organic sustainment systems developed to support a heavily task-organized ARS . Within the 1ID construct , rehearsals were critical to ensuring the ARS and the CAB could work together as an advance guard . Creating a habitual relationship between the ARS and the CAB headquarters early in planning was imperative to mission success .
Multiple command posts . Another innovation developed during planning and preparation was the use of four command posts to control the battlefield . The division employed the doctrinal DMAIN and DTAC , and alternate command posts , including a DIVARTY tactical operations center ( TOC ). It also pioneered the use of a support-area command post ( SACP ) to command and control the rear area . The way the division used the
DIVARTY TOC yielded significant benefits . When the DMAIN jumped , the DTAC assumed responsibility for the close and deep fights , and the DIVARTY TOC received additional division staff members from the G-2 ( intelligence ) all-source collection element , the joint air-ground integration cell , and the current operations section . This not only provided a location from which the commanding general could maintain situational awareness , but it also provided the reciprocal benefit of expediting target acquisition and fires prosecution times . The deep fight belonged to the DTAC during the DMAIN jump ; however , it proved vital that a contingent from current operations monitored the battle from the alternate command post . While jumping the DMAIN during the WFX , enemy indirect fires significantly degraded the DTAC . Because current operations staff monitored the fight from the DIVARTY TOC , they rapidly assumed control of the battle .
The SACP was crucial in allowing the DMAIN to focus solely on the deep fight . The deputy commanding general for support led the SACP , with constant input from the 110th MEB commander . The SACP maintained rear-area security and allowed supplies and services to flow through the operational area . The SACP staff conducted movement control and managed the reception , staging , onward movement , and integration process , while also preventing the irregular threat from influencing the efforts of the rest of the division . Placing the rear area under the command and control of a deputy commanding general with a dedicated command post allowed the 1ID to integrate rear-area operations into the overall battle . The staff of the SACP had full situational awareness and was able to take preemptive action to ensure forward mission success . While this fourth command post required a significant investment in people and resources , it contributed immeasurably to the division ’ s success in the fight .
WFXs are designed to challenge every aspect of a unit , and the 1ID was tested . Both command posts ( DMAIN and DTAC ) were brought into play as part of the exercise and subject to enemy activity . To execute mission command over extended distances and protect against OPFOR actions , both command posts jumped several times . Further still , the OPFOR employed persistent chemical weapons against the division , a rarely used tactic . With each successive challenge , the division continued to adapt and thrive . Eventually , with the OPFOR ’ s
82 January-February 2017
MILITARY REVIEW