Breaking the Crucible : The Success of an Opportunistic Division in Decisive Action
Throughout its WFX planning and preparation , the 1ID had innovated and adapted to address emergent challenges . Army Techniques Publication 3-91 , Division Operations , describes how a division , “ shapes the operation for subordinate brigades , resources them for their missions , and coordinates , synchronizes and sequences their operations in time and space .” 12 While simple in principle , the sheer scope of this definition is daunting . With tens of thousands of soldiers spread out over hundreds of kilometers , the synchronization of units , critical assets , operations , intelligence , and fires appears a near impossible task . Over the course of three command-post exercises , the 1ID adapted its systems to simplify the synchronization process and set conditions for subordinate commanders to exercise disciplined initiative and seize fleeting opportunities .
Many of these adaptations were already considered fundamental operational principles , yet they are often misunderstood or misapplied . Four adaptations in particular stand out for their importance to generating opportunistic behavior . Creating an appropriate task organization and the necessary command-and-support relationship are perhaps the most important adaptations , followed closely by articulating a well-defined operational framework and establishing clear graphic control measures . Combined , these adaptations facilitated the division ’ s opportunistic behavior .
Task organization and command-and-support relationships . Within an ad-hoc formation of multiple unified action partners , assigned and attached brigades , and countless smaller enabling units and assets , two functions that units must get right are task organization and command-and-support relationships . Opportunistic behavior implies that a unit not only sees an opportunity but also can take advantage of it . If critical assets are not available to the unit , it cannot exercise disciplined initiative . In the 1ID , Annex A ( Task Organization ) of all operation and fragmentary orders detailed units down to the separate-company and critical-asset level . This task organization was refined daily based on changing circumstances . Commanders at all levels provided detailed briefings of their task organization during daily updates , and commanders conducted digital “ flyovers ” of their formations within the WARSIM program to check that their task organization was correct in the simulated scenario .
Equally important was the emphasis on the doctrinal understanding and implementation of command-and-support relationships . Commanders and staffs conducted significant dialogue to assign units appropriate relationships . This was of substantial importance as the task organization shifted rapidly to meet emerging challenges . To reduce the potential for confusion , planners would often detail the inherent responsibilities associated with each command-and-support relationship as specified tasks in operation and fragmentary orders .
Operational framework . Another adaptation that enabled synchronization throughout the division was the clear and continual articulation of the operational framework ’ s deep , close , and security areas , and main and supporting efforts . This provided subordinate units temporal orientation and prioritization of efforts at all times . 13 Commonly referred to as the “ division fight ,” the headquarters used the operational framework to define how it would enable subordinates for the current fight while setting the conditions for the next fight . The operational framework further assisted the commander by providing a conceptual basis for planners to build branches and sequels to the base plan and anticipate future decision points . While clear articulation of an operational framework is vital to enabling opportunistic behavior , the framework must be continuously reevaluated to ensure its suitability for changing conditions .
Graphic control measures . Well-developed graphic control measures are another key adaptation . They communicate the commander ’ s intent on a map or common operating picture , providing a basis for shared understanding and flexibility throughout the formation . The 1ID staff built robust operational graphics , and duplicated them across all analog and digital platforms . Operational graphics by definition support the overall scheme of maneuver , intelligence , sustainment , and fires , but opportunistic units take graphics a step further . They build graphic control measures , including routes , checkpoints , phase lines , and fire-support coordination measures beyond those required for the selected course of action . They build them to be both internal and external to their areas of operation . For the 1ID , graphics facilitated rapid guidance to subordinate units when unforeseen challenges and opportunities arose .
80 January-February 2017
MILITARY REVIEW