Warfighter exercises ( WFXs ) are the crucible training events for division headquarters and staffs . With this in mind , the 1st Infantry Division ( 1ID ), the “ Big Red One ,” set out on an eight-month journey culminating in the division successfully executing a near-peer , hybrid-warfare training exercise . The Big Red One would secure the fictional city of Baku and drive the World Class Opposing Force ( OPFOR ) south of the Kura River back into its territory . Throughout the WFX , the 1ID staff , subordinate units , and unified action partners demonstrated adaptability , innovation , and initiative on a broad scale . In the complex “ Decisive Action Training Environment ,” where units are presented with a highly capable “ near-peer competitor in a hybrid threat environment ,” the 1ID and its partners were able to blunt enemy strengths , mitigate risks to the force and the mission , and rapidly seize upon tactical and operational opportunities whenever they arose . 1 This article describes how the 1ID built a cohesive team , met the vaunted World Class OPFOR in battle , and broke the crucible .
Planning : Before the Crucible
The 1ID is an opportunistic unit : It demonstrates the ability to create shared understanding , innovate rapidly , observe and anticipate future enemy actions and events , exercise disciplined initiative , and react quickly to seize upon fleeting opportunities . 2 An opportunistic unit is not epitomized by a few brilliant leaders sprinkled throughout its ranks . Nor is it characterized by a dictatorial , genius commander bending the unit to his or her will . Rather , it is saturated with trained , informed , and empowered leaders who act with disciplined initiative to drive the organization toward a common goal . Opportunistic units exemplify the principles of mission command in training and in combat . Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0 , Mission Command , describes such a unit : Commanders provide a clear intent to their forces that guides subordinates ’ actions while promoting freedom of action and initiative . Subordinates , by understanding the commander ’ s intent and the overall common objective , are then able to adapt to rapidly changing situations and exploit fleeting opportunities . 3
The U . S . Army Operating Concept : Win in a Complex World describes future operating environments as complex , defining a complex environment as one “ that is not only unknown , but unknowable and constantly changing .” 4 In complex environments , potential enemies will seek to outmatch U . S . military forces asymmetrically and to challenge them across every domain . The Army Operating Concept further describes how future operating environments will require “ innovative and adaptive leaders and cohesive teams that thrive in conditions of complexity and uncertainty .” 5 Both the Operating Concept and Army mission-command doctrine agree that in future conflicts , U . S . military units must demonstrate opportunistic behavior in order to defeat their enemies . Their leaders need to commit the time and energy to cultivate critical relationships based on trust , to focus on training and leader development , and to encourage the exercise of disciplined initiative throughout their formations .
In this context , many military units seem to lack enough trained and experienced personnel , specialized technology , and resources to build an opportunistic organization . However , while obstacles clearly exist , they can be overcome — not through technology , but through leaders who develop a unifying vision and utilize the principles of mission command to create lasting cultural change throughout the organization . As the Big Red One headed toward its crucible training event , the division ’ s leaders developed a clear idea of where they needed to go . But , success did not happen overnight .
Big Red One ’ s situation . In August 2015 , on the heels of its deployment in support of Operation Inherent Resolve ( U . S . Central Command ’ s operation against the Islamic State ), the Big Red One faced a unique set of challenges . In addition to the perennial problem of personnel turnover after a deployment , the division headquarters struggled to adapt to the Focus Area Review Group II restructuring initiative : the headquarters would reduce by 25 percent but maintain all mission requirements . 6 The division had also just lost one of its three brigade combat teams ( BCTs ) to Army structure changes . Of the two remaining BCTs , the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team ( ABCT ), had recently returned from Operation Spartan Shield ( conducting regional engagements in southwest Asia ) and had been replaced in the Middle East by the division ’ s 2nd ABCT . In addition , the 1st Sustainment Brigade ( SB ) was not aligned to the division and was deployed in support of U . S . Central Command missions . With the
74 January-February 2017
MILITARY REVIEW