Military Review English Edition January-February 2017 | Page 71

SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

Commanders of conventional forces might assume or
be misinformed that SR capability exists in theater but
discover later that the capability is not available when
needed. To structure Army units with such a large gap in
reliable operational surveillance units dedicated to this
difficult mission seems shortsighted.

Unmanned
Aircraft Systems

according to a 2015 Washington Post article.6 While the
clarity of a UAV video feed can be superior to the radio
transmission or still photos of a reconnaissance team, it
sometimes provides a false sense of complete information
when not integrated with other information collection
methods. Drone signatures can present risks to operations, and they can be easily
targeted by forces with
even a moderate level of
air defense. A UAV often
needs to be queued onto
a target by assets on the
ground as it has a narrow
view of the battlefield and
is isolated from the events
happening on the ground.
UASs should be viewed as
a powerful augmentation
to ground surveillance
units, not a replacement
for them. Conventional
commanders relying on
SOF and UASs need to
ensure that weather and
higher-priority missions
do not constrain their organic information collection capability.

The proliferation of
UASs, the steady improvement in portability of
unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) feeds, and the
increase in sensor capability have been significant
during the Global War on
Terrorism. Live or nearlive full-motion video sets
the standard for complete
reporting from a surveillance asset. UAVs may
interdict targets while
providing surveillance, and
they present low risk to
personnel if compromised.
Many UASs also provide
increased communication
with tactical forces as
well. UASs are generally
Long-Range
Long-range surveillance (LRS) soldiers from the 18th Airborne
Corps
LRS
company
certify
on
the
special
patrol
infiltration
and
exable to communicate with
Surveillance
traction system at Fort Pickett, Virginia, on 23 September 2012 in
every level of a convenLRS companies are orpreparation for assuming the Global Response Force mission. (Photional force, making them
ganic to corps, are focused
to by Brian Fitzgerald)
extremely responsive and
solely on surveillance, and
helping create a common
should be the corps comoperational picture. These attributes make results from
mander’s most-trusted information-collection asset. The
UASs more predictable than most other surveillance
companies share the same communication architecture
assets and create the perception of a “plug-and-play”
as the command they support. They are designed to
capability. Commanders’ reliance on these assets made in- provide standoff insertion capability by land, on water,
telligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance synonymous
and in the air. An LRS company has a mission-essenwith UASs for much of the Global War on Terrorism.
tial task list, which is limited almost exclusively to
However, aerial assets are often limited by weather
information collection through surveillance. The LRS
and station time. Moreover, their use in the near future
teams should be able to provide written reports and still
at the operational tempo commanders grew to expect
pictures by high frequency or satellite communication
in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom
from anywhere in the world. The teams are all-weather
is not sustainable. Commanders could be faced with
and can be in position for seventy-two continuous hours
a reduction in UAS capacity rather than an increase,
without support or up to seven days with deliberate
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