Military Review English Edition January-February 2017 | Page 69
SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE
the Army’s LRS companies. Due at least in part to this,
the Army announced that all LRS companies will be
disbanded—no plan to replace the only operational-level
surveillance formation has been announced. However, a
no-growth reorganization of the Army’s LRS units from
separate companies to a consolidated battalion would
provide corps commanders more effective, responsive, and
predictable organic surveillance assets than nonorganic, ad
hoc relationships and technology.
Special Operations Forces
Some conventional commanders may view using SOF
teams for surveillance as the easiest and most effective
answer to their requirements. The SOF “brand” is trusted, taken at face value, and can deliver impressive results.
One of the twelve core activities of SOF is special reconnaissance (SR): “reconnaissance and surveillance actions
conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or
diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments
to collect or verify information of strategic or operational
significance, employing military capabilities not normally
found in conventional forces.”1 Using SOF elements for
SR absolves the conventional commander from training
oversight of high-risk exercises. Operationally, the chance
of compromise, injury, and mission failure can lead
commanders to prefer using surveillance elements from
outside their organization. SOF bring many assets and
operational approaches not found in conventional units.
These elements should be a part of corps and joint task
force commanders’ surveillance options.
Ostensibly, all Special Forces (SF) operational detachments-A (SFODs–A) can conduct SR, and most can
infiltrate denied areas. Some have standoff airborne insertion capability. Some SFODs–A have waterborne and
small-vehicle capability. The ability of every SFOD–A to
conduct SR could create the false impression that abundant manned surveillance capability is available to Army
forces. In addition to SF, the Ranger Reconnaissance
Company (RRC) expanded from a detachment and
increased its capabilities far beyond traditional reconnaissance techniques. During a Joint Readiness Training
Center rotation in October 2012, an XVIII Airborne
Corps deputy corps commander told the author that in
the event of a real war, Army commanders likely would
use an RRC team to conduct surveillance behind enemy
lines rather than an LRS team.2 Teams from the RRC
are extremely proficient in military free-fall parachute
MILITARY REVIEW January-February 2017
insertions and numerous information-collection activities. Their proven results in recent conflicts across
the range of military operations indicate that they will
continue to be employed at a high operational tempo for
the near future. RRC availability to provide dedicated
support to conventional operational commanders is
uncertain, at best.
Contrary to the perception of abundant manned
surveillance capacity, SF already have more missions
than resources. In a large-scale conflict, the best SOF
SR teams would be aligned with missions of national or
strategic priority as they arose. Their employment for
those priorities would deprive operational commanders of surveillance assets, as happened in the Falklands
Campaign, where British Special Air Service (SAS) teams
were promised to the joint commander as an operational
reconnaissance resource. They were also dual tasked by
the national authority with conducting raids to destroy
shore-to-ship missiles. During the campaign, the national
authority re-tasked the SAS teams and deprived the joint
commander of this asset at critical times.3
Each SOF team has many special skills that it
must maintain to a high degree of competency. The
teams tasked to prioritize SR would likely support
SOF missions. It is unlikely they would be available to
provide support to conventional forces for long
Capt. Brian Fitzgerald,
durations, if at all.
U.S. Army, was the 1st
While any SF teams
Battalion (Airborne), 509th
can conduct SR, they
Infantry Regiment S-3
may operate at a level
operations officer from
of expertise far below
November 2015 to July
mission requirements,
2016. His previous assignas deep reconnaissance
ments include operations
missions in Operation
officer of Headquarters
Desert Storm demonstratand Headquarters
ed. For example, Charles
Battalion, XVIII Airborne
Lane Toomey writes that
Corps, company command
Operational Detachment
of XVIII Airborne Corps
Alpha 555 conducted SR
long-range surveillance,
after training in Kuwait
and long-range surveillance
before their mission.4 The
detachment leader. He
team’s lack of proficiency
has deployed in support
in interpreting satellite
of Operations Enduring
imagery and finding a
Freedom, Iraqi Freedom,
suitable hide site, overall
New Dawn, and Joint
surveillance plan, and
Guardian.
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