Military Review English Edition January-February 2017 | Page 69

SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE the Army’s LRS companies. Due at least in part to this, the Army announced that all LRS companies will be disbanded—no plan to replace the only operational-level surveillance formation has been announced. However, a no-growth reorganization of the Army’s LRS units from separate companies to a consolidated battalion would provide corps commanders more effective, responsive, and predictable organic surveillance assets than nonorganic, ad hoc relationships and technology. Special Operations Forces Some conventional commanders may view using SOF teams for surveillance as the easiest and most effective answer to their requirements. The SOF “brand” is trusted, taken at face value, and can deliver impressive results. One of the twelve core activities of SOF is special reconnaissance (SR): “reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces.”1 Using SOF elements for SR absolves the conventional commander from training oversight of high-risk exercises. Operationally, the chance of compromise, injury, and mission failure can lead commanders to prefer using surveillance elements from outside their organization. SOF bring many assets and operational approaches not found in conventional units. These elements should be a part of corps and joint task force commanders’ surveillance options. Ostensibly, all Special Forces (SF) operational detachments-A (SFODs–A) can conduct SR, and most can infiltrate denied areas. Some have standoff airborne insertion capability. Some SFODs–A have waterborne and small-vehicle capability. The ability of every SFOD–A to conduct SR could create the false impression that abundant manned surveillance capability is available to Army forces. In addition to SF, the Ranger Reconnaissance Company (RRC) expanded from a detachment and increased its capabilities far beyond traditional reconnaissance techniques. During a Joint Readiness Training Center rotation in October 2012, an XVIII Airborne Corps deputy corps commander told the author that in the event of a real war, Army commanders likely would use an RRC team to conduct surveillance behind enemy lines rather than an LRS team.2 Teams from the RRC are extremely proficient in military free-fall parachute MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2017 insertions and numerous information-collection activities. Their proven results in recent conflicts across the range of military operations indicate that they will continue to be employed at a high operational tempo for the near future. RRC availability to provide dedicated support to conventional operational commanders is uncertain, at best. Contrary to the perception of abundant manned surveillance capacity, SF already have more missions than resources. In a large-scale conflict, the best SOF SR teams would be aligned with missions of national or strategic priority as they arose. Their employment for those priorities would deprive operational commanders of surveillance assets, as happened in the Falklands Campaign, where British Special Air Service (SAS) teams were promised to the joint commander as an operational reconnaissance resource. They were also dual tasked by the national authority with conducting raids to destroy shore-to-ship missiles. During the campaign, the national authority re-tasked the SAS teams and deprived the joint commander of this asset at critical times.3 Each SOF team has many special skills that it must maintain to a high degree of competency. The teams tasked to prioritize SR would likely support SOF missions. It is unlikely they would be available to provide support to conventional forces for long Capt. Brian Fitzgerald, durations, if at all. U.S. Army, was the 1st While any SF teams Battalion (Airborne), 509th can conduct SR, they Infantry Regiment S-3 may operate at a level operations officer from of expertise far below November 2015 to July mission requirements, 2016. His previous assignas deep reconnaissance ments include operations missions in Operation officer of Headquarters Desert Storm demonstratand Headquarters ed. For example, Charles Battalion, XVIII Airborne Lane Toomey writes that Corps, company command Operational Detachment of XVIII Airborne Corps Alpha 555 conducted SR long-range surveillance, after training in Kuwait and long-range surveillance before their mission.4 The detachment leader. He team’s lack of proficiency has deployed in support in interpreting satellite of Operations Enduring imagery and finding a Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, suitable hide site, overall New Dawn, and Joint surveillance plan, and Guardian. 67