Military Review English Edition January-February 2017 | Page 67

COMPLEX IPB issue becomes what national and international instruments of power could be enabled apart from military force in order to restore the Donbass region’s systems specifically, and Ukraine’s identity, ecosystem, and postrevolutionary equilibrium overall. Conclusion The complex IPB process expands the doctrinal intelligence preparation processes to include bottom-up intelligence refinement and dynamic human network analysis. Therefore, in operational environments characterized by complex demographics and their various incentive structures, complex IPB provides a much needed comprehensive analysis—not only of these system dynamics but also of their interactions and capabilities on varying levels. Complex IPB, as employed during the Ukrainian forces’ 2015 practical exercise, undoubtedly helped the participants achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the OE specifically, and of the antiterrorism operations as a whole. The Ukraine experience with employment of complex IPB suggests the strong potential for achieving similar results in other operations, such as antiterrorism operations in Africa. Other potential test cases for this process could include operations in the Caucasus and Levant regions in complex urban environments, and in megacities. It is crucial that human and group dynamics fuse with infrastructure and physical environment analysis in order to understand anti-access/ area denial hybrid-threat connections and to create the most comprehensive understanding possible of human behaviors that affect operations. Slava Ukraini, Geroyam Slava (Glory to Ukraine, Glory to the Heroes) Notes 1. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2014), 1-2. ATP 2-01.3 also is published as Marine Corps Reference Publication 2-3A, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid., 1-1. A Marine Corps staff analyzes “the threat and the environment in a specific geographic area.” 4. Ibid., 1-2. 5. Ibid. 6. Tom Pike and Eddie Brown, “Complex IPB,” Small Wars Journal website, 24 March 2016, accessed 5 December 2016, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/complex-ipb. Pike and Brown’s model shows similarities to Jamison Jo Medby and Russell W. Glenn, Street Smart: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for Urban Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2002), accessed 24 October 2016, https://www. rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/ MR1287.pdf. 7. Pike and Brown, “Complex IPB.” 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid.; Tom Pike and Piotr M. Zagorowski, “Dense Urban Areas: The Case for Complex IPB,” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin 42, no. 3 ( July-September 2016). Note that in their March 2016 article, Pike and Brown erroneously called the first step of complex IPB “Define the area of operations,” but in Pike and Zagorowski’s July-September article, they corrected step one to read “Define the operational area.” Although published a year after the Raptor 14 team’s experience in Ukraine, the concepts in Pike and Brown, and in Pike and Zagorowski, eloquently capture the principles the team used. 10. Pike and Brown, “Complex IPB”; Joint Publication ( JP) 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 21 May 2014), I-1. 11. Pike and Brown, “Complex IPB.” MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2017 12. JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 11 August 2011), xv–xvi and GL-14. 13. Ibid., xvi. 14. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation, I-1. 15. Ibid., I-5. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid., fig. I-6, p. I-25. 18. Phillip Karber and Joshua Thibeault, “Russia’s New-Generation Warfare,” Army Magazine website, 20 May 2016, accessed 5 December 2016, https://www.ausa.org/articles/ russia%E2%80%99s-new-generation-warfare. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Michael Armstrong, Armstrong’s Handbook of Reward Management Practice: Improving Performance through Reward, 5th ed. (London: Kogan, 2015), describes ways that incentives influence individual decision making, cooperation, and competition. 22. Elise Giuliano, “The Origins of Separatism: Popular Grievances in Donetsk and Luhansk,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 396, October 2015, accessed 24 October 2016, http://www. ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm396_ Giuliano_Oct2015_0.pdf. 23. Ibid., 2. 24. A Ukrainian officer described Projekt Novorossiya as consisting of seven territories and involving the notion that Ukraine is not sovereign and historically belongs to Russia. Novorossiya plans came to fruition first with Crimea and then by the Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts. The overall goal of the project was to unite Kharkiv, Lugansk, Donestsk, Zaporizhia, Mikolaiv, and Odessa with Transnistria and isolate Ukraine from the Black Sea. Projekt Novorossiya is considered defunct due to lack of popular support. 25. In “Complex IPB,” Pike and Brown discuss the potential calculations for the possible effects of different groups. 26. Karber and Thibeault, “Russia’s New-Generation Warfare.” 27. Pike and Brown, “Complex IPB.” 65