Military Review English Edition January-February 2017

Complex Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in Ukrainian Antiterrorism Operations Victor R. Morris T he U.S. Army Europe Joint Multinational Readiness Center’s Raptor 14 team supported “Battle Staff Attack the Network/Network Engagement and Company Intelligence Support Team” training for Ukrainian armed forces officers conducting antiterrorism operations September 2015 at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center (IPSC) in Yavoriv, Ukraine. The training team determined traditional doctrinal tools for intelligence preparation were inadequate to help Ukrainian intelligence staffs understand their operational environment (OE). Consequently, the team adapted the process in a way that would account for Victor R. Morris is an group dynamics and irregular warfare and how they influence the counter-IED instructor behavior of populations at the Joint Multinational relevant to the OE, conReadiness Center in sistent with a concept Germany. He has conductcalled complex intellied partnered training in gence preparation of the sixteen European nations battlefield, or complex to include Ukraine, with IPB. This experience four NATO centers of exserves as a case study cellence, and at the NATO on how cross-functionJoint Warfare Center. A al staffs and company civilian contractor and command teams can former U.S. Army officer, improve problem framhe has experience in both ing, understand relecapacities in Iraq and vant issues at all levels, Afghanistan. and inform operational 58 planning. Complex IPB can support the Army’s doctrinal intelligence preparation of the battlefield process and the joint process called joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE). From IPB to Complex IPB According to Army Techniques Publication 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, an Army intelligence staff (1) defines the OE, (2) describes environmental effects on operations, (3) evaluates the threat, and (4) determines the threat.1 The staff uses this four-step process to analyze certain mission variables in the area of interest for a specific operation.2 The mission variables analyzed are the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations.3 The goal of Army IPB is to provide Army commanders and staffs the information necessary to develop courses of action and make decisions.4 The IPB doctrine states that all four of the mission variables—including civil considerations—and their interactions must be analyzed if the process is to be effective. Staffs must “determine how the interactions of friendly forces, enemy forces, and indigenous populations affect each other.”5 However, in practice, the process tends to emphasize the enemy rather than holistically integrate the civil considerations. For instance, staffs might not adequately consider multigroup interconnectedness, micro decision making, and population behavior evaluation (i.e., human-domain-centric analysis). Thus, if an OE and its dynamics January-February 2017 MILITARY REVIEW

Military Review English Edition January-February 2017 | Page 60