Military Review English Edition January-February 2017 | Page 56
Detailed
control
Directive
control
High leve
l of
High leve
synchron l of
ization
Inexperie
nced staff
Comple
operation x terrain /
al environ
ment
New subo
rdinate
leaders
mutual tr
ust
High leve
l of situ
understan ational
ding
Inherent p
rotection
The commander
assesses environmental
and organizational
factors to determine
which method of
control to employ.
Self-confi
dence
command of
er
Proficienc
y of
subordina
te units
Environm
ental and
organizati
onal facto
rs
Detailed
control
Directive
control
(Graphic by author)
Figure 3. Conditions Warranting More Detailed Control
practices at odds with mission command. Leaders
and staffs now command an amazing array of tools
that allow them to visualize the battlefield and the
operational environment, which in turn allows them
to feel as though they are using information flow to
guide decision making. Leaders, in their minds, are
not micromanaging the mission; they are making decisions and directing action consistent with what they
are capable of understanding.
Thus, technology’s proliferation continues to
dramatically influence how U.S. commanders exercise command and control. In World War I, trench
warfare led to detailed command and control, but in
the twenty-first century, technology has had a similar
effect, leading to commanders falling too heavily
into the detailed control side of the command and
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control spectrum.15 It has undercut mission command. The byproduct of technology is faith in the
ability to obtain perfect, or near-perfect, information before launching precision weapons to destroy a
specific target. Seeking perfect information in order
to precisely kill a target in a way that minimizes the
chances of collateral damage creates an environment
of control-mania, the antithesis of mission command.
Army commanders do not accept prudent risk but
instead tend to minimize risk by setting stringently
exacting conditions before servicing a target or committing forces.
Recommendations
The principles of mission command should not
be exclusive to mission command but should be
January-February 2017 MILITARY REVIEW