Military Review English Edition January-February 2017 | Page 56

Detailed control Directive control High leve l of High leve synchron l of ization Inexperie nced staff Comple operation x terrain / al environ ment New subo rdinate leaders mutual tr ust High leve l of situ understan ational ding Inherent p rotection The commander assesses environmental and organizational factors to determine which method of control to employ. Self-confi dence command of er Proficienc y of subordina te units Environm ental and organizati onal facto rs Detailed control Directive control (Graphic by author) Figure 3. Conditions Warranting More Detailed Control practices at odds with mission command. Leaders and staffs now command an amazing array of tools that allow them to visualize the battlefield and the operational environment, which in turn allows them to feel as though they are using information flow to guide decision making. Leaders, in their minds, are not micromanaging the mission; they are making decisions and directing action consistent with what they are capable of understanding. Thus, technology’s proliferation continues to dramatically influence how U.S. commanders exercise command and control. In World War I, trench warfare led to detailed command and control, but in the twenty-first century, technology has had a similar effect, leading to commanders falling too heavily into the detailed control side of the command and 54 control spectrum.15 It has undercut mission command. The byproduct of technology is faith in the ability to obtain perfect, or near-perfect, information before launching precision weapons to destroy a specific target. Seeking perfect information in order to precisely kill a target in a way that minimizes the chances of collateral damage creates an environment of control-mania, the antithesis of mission command. Army commanders do not accept prudent risk but instead tend to minimize risk by setting stringently exacting conditions before servicing a target or committing forces. Recommendations The principles of mission command should not be exclusive to mission command but should be January-February 2017  MILITARY REVIEW