Military Review English Edition January-February 2017 | Page 53

MISSION COMMAND

inefficient, and slow methods of command are unwelcome and counterproductive. Regardless of the
method of command and control stated in doctrine,
commanders have always and will always evaluate
their units and subordinates based on how much they
trust them. Then commanders will allocate varying
degrees of independent action based upon that trust.

Mission Command in Doctrine
In his seminal work on maneuver warfare theory, Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War,
Leonhard states that nothing in military doctrine is
everlasting, regardless of how strong it is at a given
time. Leonhard continues, “Therefore, doctrine has
a life span, and its death is certain.”7 In analyzing
mission command, perhaps it too is approaching its
timely demise.
Army mission command doctrine is, in effect,
being applied in a prescriptive manner. The Army
dictates the primacy of mission command instead
of providing commanders and staffs with options
for directing action within their commands. Leaders
are forced into a dilemma: do they faithfully follow
doctrine—potentially at the expense of what is the
smart decision—or do they deviate from doctrine
based upon their understanding of their organization
and its leaders?
This dynamic highlights the need for the Army to
shelve the notion that mission command is a singular,
unquestionable approach. Instead, the Army should
encourage a more flexible approach that encourages
leaders to consider options based on their understanding of their unit and their subordinate leaders
in relation to the unit’s operational environment.

The Operating Environment’s
Influence on Command and Control
Today’s operational environments often place
Army units in situations in which their actions must
be deliberate and restrained. In many cases, the U.S.
government uses the Army as a tool to shape the
strategic environment. Where national interests are at
stake but limited objectives do not warrant large-scale
combat operations, Army units must operate with
finesse, in a manner not necessarily compatible with
mission command. Concepts such as the “strategic corporal” highlight the limits of mission command—the
MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2017

independent actions of a single soldier on the battlefield can have strategic impact.8 If soldiers’ actions
are not carefully controlled, the consequences could
affect national security. However, that notion stands in
stark contrast to the principles of mission command,
which allow soldiers to choose their actions in accordance with commander’s intent and vision, disciplined initiative, shared understanding, and mutual
trust. Command and control methods are influenced
not only by strategic mission constraints but also are
strongly influenced by technological developments.
The proliferation of communications technology,
information collection systems, and precision weaponry led the Army to over-engineer battlefield solutions.
The thinking was that near-perfect situational understanding could be achieved, enabled by using precision
weapons to kill without closing with the enemy while
greatly minimizing collateral damage. Though these
ideas are virtuous, they erode the principles of mission
command and are largely unachievable.
In many cases, technological advancement has
been geared toward providing commanders better situational awareness and improved ability to
communicate, as with digital systems such as Blue
Force Tracker, Command Post of the Future, and
unmanned aircraft systems. In the past, commanders
relied on reports from the field to populate friendly
positions on maps. Today, Blue Force Tracker and
Command Post of the Future allow commanders to
see their formations down to the individual vehicle
on high-resolution digital maps in near-real time.
The employment of unmanned aircraft systems in
conjunction with battle-tracking systems
Maj. Amos Fox,
allows commanders a
U.S. Army, is a student at
relatively high degree of
the School of Advanced
understanding. A high
Military Studies at Fort
degree of understanding,
Leavenworth, Kansas. He
coupled with ubiquitous
holds a BS from Indiana
communications systems,
University–Purdue
has led to an environUniversity Indianapolis
ment similar to that of
and an MA from Ball State
Vietnam, where comUniversity. He has served
manders at multiple echwith the 4th Infantry
elons were directing the
Division, the 11th Armored
actions of platoons and
Cavalry Regiment, and the
9
squads on the ground.
U.S. Army Armor School.
51