Military Review English Edition January-February 2017 | Page 52

The U . S . Army has sought to integrate mission command over the past decade but has run into resistance in many arenas . Mission command has not taken hold in the Army because it lacks specificity in relation to the Army ’ s conditions and culture . Nor does it align with the contemporary American way of war , which is highlighted by its information and data-obsessed pursuit of efficiency and precision . This article seeks to develop a method of command and control more in line with the praxis of Army methods and principles . It recommends rescinding the doctrinal definition of mission command , while retaining mission command ’ s principles . Army doctrine for command and control should incorporate a continuum that includes both mission command and centralized control , rather than preaching mission command but all too often practicing excess control .

The Army defines mission command as “ the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander ’ s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations .” 1 The Army assigns the following principles to guide mission command : build cohesive teams through mutual trust , create shared understanding , provide a clear commander ’ s intent , exercise disciplined initiative , use mission orders , and accept prudent risk . 2
There are two primary theories on mission command , both of which reflect the German concept of Auftragstaktik . In mission command , a commander clearly communicates his or her intent in relation to friendly forces , the enemy , and the mission but leaves the decisions on how to complete the mission with the subordinate leaders . The higher echelon commander allows subordinate leaders to develop the “ how ” based on the situation , the conditions , the terrain , familiarity with their unit , and their equipment . 3 This idea , providing latitude in execution , is at the heart of mission command , and its intellectual fountainhead , Auftragstaktik . While not explicitly referenced in any doctrinal publication , both concepts serve as the foundational underpinning of the Army ’ s command philosophy of the art of command and the science of control .
The other school of thought treats mission command and command and control as sides of the same coin . In this line of reasoning , the theory of command and control finds its genesis in the relationship between information flow and decision making . Mission command , or what military theorist Robert Leonhard calls directive control , is required when decision making can no longer keep pace with the flow of information . 4 Command and control , what Leonhard calls detailed control , is required when decision making can maintain pace with the flow of information . In this school of thought , both forms of command and control — directive control and detailed control — are acceptable and viable in modern war . The key is to balance information flow with decision-making authority . 5
However , a more granular examination suggests mission command — Leonhard ’ s directive control — is messy , inefficient , and ambiguous . Mission command is messy because it provides parameters within which one must operate instead of an instructive method of operation . Mission command is inefficient and ambiguous because it relies on imprecise , bottom-up understanding and information instead of perfect , or near-perfect , understanding . Because of this , mission command is slow in relation to higher echelons of command as lower echelons develop the situation , analyze the situation , execute courses of action , and report to higher echelons .
Mission Command in the Army Today
The Army ’ s adoption of mission command has been great for generating discussion about empowering junior leaders and developing mutual trust within formations . In 2016 , the Army released several works on mission command , to include Mission Command in the 21st Century , Training for Decisive Action : Stories of Mission Command , and 16 Cases of Mission Command . 6 Additionally , the Army ’ s professional journals and Army-related blogs are continually filled with essays advocating for mission command and the principles it entails .
However , resistance to the ethos of mission command can be found everywhere . For all the success of mission command appears to be having across the Army , there are some critical shortcomings to full application across the force . Today ’ s Army finds itself operating in an environment in which messy ,
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MILITARY REVIEW