Military Review English Edition January-February 2017 | Page 46

H. R. McMaster, “forward deterrence involves land
from posturing to seizing operational initiative.
forces. ... It is very difficult to achieve political outAccording to Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0,
8
comes from standoff range.”
Unified Land Operations, this foundational action is
When Mexico threatened war over American annex- designed to “gain a position of advantage that degrades
ation of its former territory, Texas, scattered U.S. Army
and defeats the enemy throughout the depth of an
garrisons coalesced to deter
organization.”12 As proven in the
potential incursion across the Rio
Inchon Landings of the Korean War
Grande. In January 1846, in reand the sweeping envelopments of
sponse to a Mexican Army buildthe Persian Gulf War, unified teams
up along the border, Brig. Gen.
that attack rapidly and forcefully at
Zachary Taylor led the newly
the onset of hostilities or at advanformed “Army of Observation,”
tageous points during major combat
comprising approximately 3,900
operations can dictate the battle and
infantrymen, artillerymen, and
exploit opportunities.
9
dragoons, to the Gulf Coast.
For Taylor and his small army,
Similar to the massing of allied
deterrence soon failed and both
forces in West Germany in the
sides moved to seize initiative. The
1950s to deter Russian aggression,
American main force quickly won
Taylor aimed to dissuade Mexico
bloody victories at Palo Alto and
from challenging U.S. territorial
Resaca de la Palma along the Rio
claims through physical presence.
Grande in May 1846. These victoDaguerreotype of Brig. Gen. Zachary Taylor,
Also similar to today, the ad hoc
ries allowed invasion of northeast
ca.
1843–1845.
Taylor
was
appointed
by
army benefited from a degree of
Mexico while smaller columns
President James K. Polk to lead U.S. forces
professionalization that allowed
conducted
deep attacks into New
sent to deter Mexican aggression along the
the regiments to join, if imperMexico and California. Though
Texas–Mexico border brought on by the U.S.
annexation of Texas. Deterrence failed, and the
fectly, as a combined arms team.
small in size, each of the expeditions
Mexican-American
War
broke
out
in
April
1846.
Because of the regular army’s
employed technological overmatch
(Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)
strength at fewer than 7,500
to defeat an array of defending
soldiers at the onset of war, the
Mexican garrisons—except for a
United States was compelled to adopt a mobilization
tactical setback near San Diego.13 Akin to numerous
model similar to what it uses today: heavy reliance on
twentieth-century campaigns where operational initiavolunteer units to conduct “total force” campaigns of
tive compensated for inferior numbers, rapid successes
10
mass and scale. When Taylor established camp at
allowed American troops to occupy favorable political
Corpus Christi, he received, integrated, and trained state terrain and ultimately empowered the U.S. government
regiments from Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi,
to demand strategic concessions.
and Texas to create the “Army of Occupation” in the conThe economized forced entry into Alta California,
tested territory. Throughout the next two years, thouin particular, reflected a high degree of joint cooperation
sands of volunteers from nearly every state would rotate
between Army forces, the Navy’s Pacific Squadron, and
to provide the combat power necessary to defeat the far
rebel militia as they defeated and expelled the Presidio
larger Mexican military. Though use of volunteers often
garrisons. When an element of the 1st U.S. Dragoons
came at a heavy price due to their indiscipline, many
under Brig. Gen. Stephen Kearny initially suffered defeat
recruits, such as western frontiersmen who specialized in at the Battle of San Pasqual in December 1846, a coastal
irregular tactics, added special capabilities to the regulars’ contingent of marines and sailors reinforced the horseconventional strengths.11
men to win several follow-on engagements, retake Los
The third phase of joint operations begins when deAngeles, and establish a provisional government. Though
terrence fails and decisive action is required. When con- the partnership was marred by interservice rivalry, the
flict becomes unavoidable, American forces transition
joint success accelerated American gains. Two thousand
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January-February 2017  MILITARY REVIEW