were few facts and a lot of assumptions about this evolving mission . First , and foremost , the brigade aggressively implemented a leader development program that initially leveraged the Security Force Assistance Advisor Team ( SFAAT ) Academy , which is based at the Joint Readiness Training Center . Their program of instruction was an excellent primer for advise-and-assist tasks , refreshed the unit ’ s understanding of Iraq ’ s cultural nuances , and provided a great start point to examine the mission . 11
Ideally , the politics-and-policy officer could supply this type of “ primer ” at home station , using the SFAAT Academy program of instruction as a base and adding regionally specific context from a variety of sources , including academia . This type of training at home station would allow the unit ’ s training-center rotation to serve as a certifying exercise .
In addition to existing military training programs , Buzzard expanded his predeployment preparation to other nontraditional resources that focused on leader professional development : Col . Joel Rayburn , author of Iraq After America , presented a session to key leaders on his recent book and research on Operation Iraqi Freedom . His insights into Iraqi political and military institutional change since U . S . forces departed Iraq was hugely beneficial , and his connections to experts that the BCT would later leverage during the deployment were equally important . In addition , the BCT hosted the West Point ’ s Combating Terrorism Center , which shared its most recent products on the Islamic State and offered valuable perspectives on the politics in Baghdad and the retreat of Iraqi forces in 2014 . The BCT also invited the Negotiations Project from West Point and executed a seminar on developing negotiation strategies for the BCT ’ s leaders . 12
A full-time politics-and-policy officer could develop and implement this type of unconventional , “ out of the box ” training . The officer would work closely with the brigade S-3 to ensure the training was properly balanced with other mandatory and predeployment training .
Finally , the Army does not have to do this alone . A whole-of-government approach that leverages interagency partners could also help fill this gap . Adapting the State Department Provincial Reconstruction Team program to assign foreign-service officers to Army BCTs could be explored as a pilot program for improving the task organization and enhancing the building-partner-capacity and advise-and-assist effectiveness of Army formations . Another option would allow the Army to send its politics-and-policy officers to a civilian graduate school and follow such study with an assignment to an interagency partner such as the DOS . Doing so would enable these officers to serve in an embassy as a member of an ambassador ’ s country team or at the DOS headquarters in order to understand how the political-military sections integrate their specific country ’ s perspectives into U . S . foreign policy goals . As I wrote in an article for the Task and Purpose website , “ The United States already has experience with security sector reform and has published doctrine to define the relationship between the DOS , U . S . Agency for International Development , and Department of Defense . In it , these agencies are tasked to work together to provide reform efforts directed at the institutions , processes , and forces that provide security and promote the rule of law in a host country .” 13
Expanding this arrangement to incorporate civilian experts into a BCT ’ s culminating training event as well as its real-world deployments could be another option for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of BCTs deployed to conduct partnership operations . While this would not expand the intellectual capital within the Army , it would leverage the knowledge of career civil servants who arguably have a better understanding of culture and politics .
The risk to the interagency support program is in the civilian ’ s lack of experience with Army tactical operations . The advantage of training a successful company commander with an additional skill rests with this officer ’ s ability to understand and integrate politics and policy into existing warfighting functions like fires and maneuver .
While I expect my next job to be a return to a tactical infantry battalion , what became apparent over my time with 3rd BCT was that for tactical decisions at the battalion and company level to be truly exceptional , they must be informed by a political , strategic , and cultural understanding of the HN , by the interests of other governmental and nongovernmental actors , and
40 January-February 2017
MILITARY REVIEW