Military Review English Edition January-February 2017 | Page 40

what might otherwise be a somewhat ad hoc effort, and relieve some of the task-saturation problem for other staff officers. The brigade was also constrained by a number of other factors, particularly restrictions on the number of personnel in theater and an inability to operate outside forward operating bases. The operational environment was also complicated by numerous other U.S. and coalition government agencies as well as many factions within the Iraqi government and security apparatus. The BCT quickly recognized that regional and Iraqi-specific context and information were critical to accomplishing its training and advising mission. Buzzard explains, Without this context and understanding, multiple units could have easily inadvertently caused a long-term problem while pursuing a seemingly logical short-term solution. Given the complexity of the operational environment, the brigade prioritized a “mission first” perspective over concerns about lines of authority, task organization, or who received credit—3/82’s deployment adopted a “one team” approach.9 Despite this “mission first” attitude, some missions conflicted with others, and adjacent units, superior and subordinate command headquarters, and peers on the brigade staff did not have refined processes for evaluating the myriad of stakeholders’ interests. Various parties’ interests, both within and external to the immediate BCT battle space, influenced the area of operations and decision making for applying combat power. This is not an indictment of any individual or command—on the contrary, it is an observation that the task organization of the Army’s unit of employment, the BCT, has not been adapted to meet the changing battlefield environment, and it is less than ideally suited to operate and exercise lethal and nonlethal force among large populations of noncombatants. Operations that require the skills of a politics-and-policy officer include— training an HN security force, equipping an HN security force, advising and assisting HN military and political leaders on employment of their force, and conducting lethal and nonlethal fires in support of HN ground maneuver. BCTs will not be able to effectively balance these tactical missions and their strategic consequences unless we task-organize and manage our talent • • • • 38 appropriately to bridge the gap described above. Therefore, the brigade politics-and-policy officer should be given the following duty description: An assigned officer on the BCT staff will be responsible for making tactical recommendations to the brigade commander based on an assessment of governmental influences on HN security forces training, equipping, and employment. This recommendation should include the officer’s evaluation of data from multiple sources and, upon the brigade commander’s approval, it can be used to create products that support advise-and-assist teams at the battalion level in their evaluation of partnered forces. Equally important, a focus on this type of HN security forces assessment will help provide the brigade commander with an accurate understanding of the capabilities of training units, enabling better decisions about employment in support of all aspects of urban land operations. The brigade politics-and-policy officer should be given the following key tasks: understand HN political leaders’ party affiliation, legal obligation, and election cycle; identify informal or opposition leaders not in government (by definition, a key leader engagement only allows us to interact with the winners of the democratic process even if they do not represent more than 51 percent of any given population); and track political and policy outcomes of numerous interested governments and assess the potential impact politics and policy will have on HN security force capacity building. The purpose of formalizing this staff position is to institutionalize intellectual capital within the BCT in the same way we already focus on building tactical and operational expertise for our company commanders and field grade officers. Interestingly enough, the Army already has a repository of officers that could immediately fill this gap. They have already completed advanced civilian schooling, many have published in the fields of political science and force employment, and all have proven to be successful company grade officers at the tactical level. Prior to making any changes to the modified table of organization and equipment, a pilot program could allow the Army and BCT commanders to test this concept. Officers teaching in the U.S. Military Academy’s Department of Social Sciences are already spending their summers attached to fielded-force units to provide this support. Col. Cindy Jebb, who heads the • • • January-February 2017  MILITARY REVIEW