Military Review English Edition January-February 2017 | Page 37

POLITICS-AND-POLICY OFFICER

The Need for a Brigade
Politics-and-Policy
Staff Officer
Maj. Adam Scher, U.S. Army

B

y June 2015, morning battlefield-update briefs
were routine in the 3rd Brigade Combat Team
(BCT) of the 82nd Airborne Division’s Baghdad
command post. On one morning of that month, however, there was a critical difference: it was the first time a
member of the staff was asked to provide commentary
and analysis about the politics-and-policy decisions
of regional governments, coalition partners, and the
government of Iraq. Given my position as an assistant
professor of American politics, policy, and strategy at
the United States Military Academy at West Point,
Col. Curtis Buzzard, the 3rd BCT commander, asked
me to help explain how the 7 June national elections in
Turkey might influence our partnership with the Iraqi
Army’s Ninewa Operations Command and the operational planning to liberate Mosul.
This was not the first time that a brigade commander
asked me to fill this role. In 2008, while serving with the
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) in Yusifiyah, Iraq,
Col. Dominic Caraccilo asked me to study the Iraqi political process, interact with key State Department (DOS)
officials, meet regularly with local political leaders, act as
an advocate for the Iraqi population, and advise him on
the political landscape within the areas of operations and
interest.1 Seven years later, I volunteered to spend the
summer with 3rd BCT because I believed the setup of

Spc. Rose Lewis, 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82nd Airborne
Division, interprets for Maj. Adam Scher, Iraqi Security Forces development officer and political officer for 3rd BCT, and Col. Mohammed, Ninewa Operations Command action officer for popular
mobilization forces integration, as they discuss the effect of Turkey’s
elections on the planning process for liberating Mosul 27 July 2015 at
the Iraqi Ground Forces Command Headquarters compound, Baghdad, Iraq. (Photo by James Polk, U.S. Army)
MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2017

brigade staffs did not account for the difference between
its evolving operational needs and the structure and
responsibilities of its staff. I worked with 3rd BCT in the
summer because they, like every other BCT in the Army,
had no officer at the brigade level to examine the politics
and policy of their assigned region, and no foreign-service
officers embedded in their formations.
During discussions in Iraq with others on the
brigade staff, subordinate battalions, and our higher
headquarters, it became apparent we lacked a clear
procedure or person to assist in interpreting the Iraqi
government’s political decisions, in exploring the domestic politics of regional partners and adversaries, or even
in understanding the differences between the Title 10,
U.S. Code, authorities and functions of the combined
joint task force and the Title 22 functions of the Office
of Security Cooperation that has been operating in Iraq
since 2011.2 This lack of understanding reduced our
capacity to partner, advise, and assist when our counterparts asked questions about regional dynamics or global
issues with which we were not familiar or for which we
lacked an appreciation. The BCT staff structure limited
our ability to fully understand our operational environment and best apply combat power.
This gap also highlighted the apparent beginning of
what has become a recurring complaint about field grade
officers and more senior military leaders—that the “best
military advice” they provide is too frequently tactically
sound but strategically and politically uninformed. As
former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen.
James Cartwright noted,
We forget the other elements of national power
will be integrated into the objective at the
highest levels of government. We fail to recall
the use of force is a political decision—part of
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