DELIBERATE WAR PLANNING of democratic societies structured so that it would be difficult to re-create empires , thereby ensuring that a global , near-unlimited war would not occur again . In Germany , this was accomplished by the occupation , the civil – military government , and , ultimately , the Marshall Plan .
Thus , the military activities envisioned in deliberate war plans must be designed as an initial step to generate a new normal that enables the U . S . government to employ the nonmilitary tools that actually generate the desired conditions . This need to employ nonmilitary tools to achieve national objectives has major implications for the manner in which the military activities are carried out . Recent U . S . military doctrinal changes , such as the addition of legitimacy , restraint , and perseverance as principles of war , lend credence to the need for nonmilitary tools . 14
As we have seen , the nonmilitary U . S . government agencies responsible for nonmilitary tools are important deliberate war planning stakeholders . But a disparity between them and the military in planning capacity prevents commensurate participation : none
A British officer provides guidance to his tank commanders during a sand table rehearsal prior to a battle for Tobruk , Libya , in 1941 . ( Photo courtesy of Library of Congress / Official British Army photo No . BO 773 [ BM 7241 ])
of the nonmilitary organizations comes close to matching the military ’ s capacity for deliberate war planning . Additionally , culture clash among the military establishment and nonmilitary agencies frequently occurs due to different approaches to planning .
Military planners are more accustomed to assumptions-based , policy-unconstrained thinking than the intelligence community , the State Department , and other civilian-led agencies . This includes exploration of options that are not feasible under present-day U . S . government policy or resource constraints . Additionally , value-adding deliberate war planning requires an orientation on planning assumptions regarding the employment of nonmilitary agents that shape a future hypothetical political and social reality that may not ever materialize . However , the bureaucratic cultures of many nonmilitary agencies
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