or nationalist movement . Still , to shift emphasis away from the “ religious ” aspect and toward the idea of this being a “ movement ,” and to understand that the religious dynamic might just as easily be ( or become ) social or nationalist , allows a wider range of options for secular engagement with , or against , the phenomenon .
Potential Converts
Hoffer next tackles the definition and categorization of the types of potential converts a mass movement draws upon . The key insight here is that neither the abject poor nor the unified poor present a threat , but that — among others — the newly poor , the creative poor , and a category he calls “ misfits ” contribute most of the participants to a mass movement ’ s active phase . Hoffer says it “ is usually those whose poverty is relatively recent , the ‘ new poor ,’ who throb with the ferment of frustration . The memory of better things is as fire in their veins .” 18
It is worth noting here that the driving force behind much of Daesh ’ s military success has been not a religious fervor but the planning , abilities , and impassioned involvement of a number of Saddam Hussein ’ s former military officers . 19 These officers were marginalized due to disbandment of the Iraqi Army after the U . S . -led invasion of 2003 . They became poor , yet remembered , and still remember , the power and status conferred through their positions in Hussein ’ s regime . As unreliable and potentially murderous as these individuals might be , at least in terms of participation in a mass movement such as radical Islam , as Hoffer says , they are not a lost cause but rather , “ They ( the veterans ) are receptive to the preaching of a proselytizing movement and yet do not always make staunch converts . For they are not irrevocably estranged from the self ; they do not see it as irrevocably spoiled ... the slightest evidence of progress and success reconciles them with the world and their selves .” 20
This last aspect likely contributed to the success of the Anbar Awakening , as Sunni leaders , many of whom were former Baathists , united in the hope of working as part of , rather than against , the new Iraqi government . 21 Even now , leaders of Daesh drawn from among former Iraqi Baathist officials and military personnel do not seem to be irrevocably committed , as one local described Daesh ’ s current wali , or leader , in Anbar itself , “ I last saw him in 2009 . He complained that he was very poor . He is an old friend , so I gave him some money … He was fixable . If someone had given him a job and a salary , he wouldn ’ t have joined the Islamic State . There are hundreds , thousands like him .” 22
Additionally , in those areas of Syria and Iraq where citizens had been relatively affluent prior to the start of the civil war in 2011 , many men turned to Daesh as a means to maintain the livelihood of their families . 23 The need to maintain a livelihood would not be such a motivating impulse if the citizens in these areas had always been abjectly poor , for , as Hoffer says , The poor on the borderline of starvation live purposeful lives . To be engaged in a desperate struggle for food and shelter is to be wholly free from a sense of futility . The goals are concrete and immediate . … What need could they have for “ an inspiring super-individual goal which would give meaning and dignity to their lives ?” They are immune to the appeal of a mass movement . 24
Thus , for both the core of former Iraqi government and military veterans participating in radical Islam ’ s mass movements , and for the percentage of men who permit , or even assist this particular mass movement in order that they themselves and their families not become part of the new poor , the provision of financial and social lucre , or even hope , may sway significant and influential partisans toward more desirable pursuits .
Another category of potential manpower from Hoffer ’ s work relates specifically to Daesh ’ s recruiting ; these are the “ bored .” Hoffer says of them : “ There is perhaps no more reliable indicator of a society ’ s ripeness for a mass movement than the prevalence of unrelieved boredom .” 25 The attraction of fighting for Daesh proves powerful in this regard , especially “ to the bored , secure , and the uninspired in Western liberal democracies ” to whom fighting in this mass movement provides “ a thrilling cause and call to action that promises glory and esteem in the eyes of friends .” 26 This segment of the population ’ s needs for excitement and purpose , rather than ( or in conjunction with ) approaches aimed at interdicting the beginning stages of religious radicalization , should be studied .
Finally , one group Hoffer labels as difficult for mass movements to recruit — the unified poor — presents itself as a potential remedy for decreasing Daesh ’ s appeal . The unified poor tend not to join mass movements because , even though they are not wealthy , they have a strong sense of identity and collective self-worth derived from
128 January-February 2017
MILITARY REVIEW