the advantages of U . S . technological superiority . 4 Additionally , the nature and type of enemy forces the Army will face is also changing . With greater frequency , the Army will encounter situations where irregular forces , nonstate groups , and criminal organizations will either join conventional forces with similar objectives or act unilaterally to accomplish objectives in this complex terrain .
In order to be successful under these conditions , the AOC asserts that the Army must “ develop innovative leaders and optimize human performance .” 5 Such innovative leaders must be capable of succeeding in both “ high-tech ” and “ low-tech ” environments — and everything in between . The Army ’ s Human Dimension White Paper stresses this theme , noting that “ the basics ” of skills relating to successful conduct of warfare have fundamentally changed . Industrial Age warfare characterized by an emphasis on attaining mass for success is giving way to an emphasis on agility and adaptation . 6 The traditional notion that military leaders must become technical experts in known fields of military science must give way to a broader concept where military leaders possess the capacity to solve a wide array of complex problems with creative solutions derived in part from sources of knowledge outside traditional military studies .
The officer corps of today gained significant experience from years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan that provides some insight into the future conduct of our wars . Our national experience has revealed that the training completed prior to wartime deployments did not adequately prepare military leaders to conduct these wars . In a 2010 study on precommissioning
Col . Andrew Morgado , U . S . Army , is the commander of 3rd Brigade , U . S . Army Cadet Command . He holds a BA from Lehigh University and an MA from Norwich University . He is a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies , completing both the Advanced Military Studies and the Advanced Strategic Leadership Studies Programs . training , Maj . Joseph Albrecht discovered contemporary officers criticized their preparation , arguing it placed too much emphasis on task training . 7 By focusing on technical and tactical preparation , precommissioning training focused on the knowledge and skills required for immediate use on specific , technically oriented tasks vice emphasizing skills needed for longer term , more general application . 8 Over time , the specific skills addressed in precommissioning training lost relevance in the face of real world application and actual experience . Instead of skills training , feedback from deployed junior officers suggests precommissioning should emphasize the metacompetencies of self-awareness and adaptability . 9 In order to address these competencies , long-used Cadet Command models must change .
Cadet Command and Historical Tensions
Since the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964 , Cadet Command has followed a relatively stable model in educating a large portion of the officer corps . 10 Through nearly five decades , Cadet Command emphasized the use of tactical training as the principal vehicle to drive leader development . Cadet training and education operated in parallel to attainment of a baccalaureate education at a cadet ’ s respective college . The passage of the Vitalization Act cemented the distinction between training and education in military science programs on college campuses . The act was a culmination of a struggle that raged between college administrators and military leaders through the 1950s .
The sources of this friction were college administrators and educators who were horrified that Army ROTC training , which emphasized tactical skill training and marching drill led by uniformed officers , was granted the equivalency of a college-level course . 11 Consequently , many colleges through the 1950s and early 1960s established programs that substituted courses taught by civilian professors for the usual courses specified in the military science curriculum . Civilian faculty and ROTC cadre created many of these substitution programs as part of local agreements .
However , objecting to the impact this “ civilianization ” could have on the officer corps , the Department of Defense pushed through the Vitalization Act to end the substitution practice , among other changes . Military practitioners resisted the substitutions , arguing that skill-and-task training was the essential component of junior officer training . Essentially , military professionals asserted that the ROTC program existed primarily to provide the Army with competent platoon leaders upon commissioning . This short-term perspective won out over the competing perspective
100 January-February 2017
MILITARY REVIEW