Military Review English Edition January-February 2015 | Page 49

DENIERS OF “THE TRUTH”

(Photo by Sgt Curt Squires, USAJFKSWCS PAO)

John Russell, a civilian volunteer participating in the Special Forces exercise Robin Sage, plans a mission 19 November 2007 with a soldier
trying to earn his Green Beret.

interests that nested with their own or that of the shadow
government.
Fourth, on average, the ADM teams had less trouble
than the MDMP teams in adapting once they infiltrated.
On average, most officers reported they had less trouble
adapting, but almost the same percentage of NCOs noted
trouble with adapting. They were, as a team, less likely to
keep fighting their original plan, but most struggled initially
(just as the MDMP teams did) to build rapport and do
assessments. They were also more likely to spend less time
getting to the complex training objectives than the MDMP
teams, once that initial struggle was overcome.
Fifth, upon completion of the exercise, officers and
NCOs on the ADM teams were more likely to admit they
saw some value in their planning efforts, although it was not
by much. Most reported struggling with fitting their design
efforts into the MDMP. A significant number saw value in
the ADM effort in terms of being able to better incorporate
the design insights into an MDMP effort in the future.

Five Salient Differences of the
Unstructured Group from the
MDMP and ADM Groups
The last group was the unstructured group. During
planning, this group normally received information
MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2015

from discussions with me on theoretical design that
stressed reflexive thinking, situation-unique preparation, and a multi-paradigmatic approach. The teams
were instructed to build no more than 10 PowerPoint
slides, but preferably none. Most of their briefings were
done using only a map and whatever notes they had.
They were instructed to rehearse those tasks they knew
they would perform, preferably outside of their team
room 1-3 hours every day. They were told they could
use MDMP, but they were encouraged only to do so for
those very specific tasks they knew they would have to
accomplish in a relatively short timeframe (infiltration,
meeting the guerrilla chief, first twenty-four hours in
the guerrilla base, initial assessments, internal communications/dissemination plan, etc.), and to develop
their own approach as to how to prepare for the more
conceptual parts of the mission. They were encouraged
to brief only conclusions during their briefings and
allow the more detailed areas to be teased out by the
higher commander’s interests. Lastly, they were encouraged to disregard everything in their higher’s order
initially and to always identify unsupported assertions.
The majority of NCOs and officers who used
the unstructured approach provided very positive
feedback. During the planning week, very little
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