Military Review English Edition January-February 2015 | Page 40
To demonstrate the importance of heuristic training,
consider that before the World War II battle of Leyte
Gulf (1944-1945), the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN)
had studied extensively the prior actions of U.S. Navy
admirals. Understanding that Adm. William F. Halsey
was habitually aggressive in his pursuit of Japanese
aircraft carriers, the IJN plan, called Shō-Gō 1, placed
a decoy fleet led by Vice-Adm. Jisaburō Ozawa to lure
Halsey’s 3rd Fleet away from the eastern flank of the
Philippines. After Halsey’s 3rd Fleet reconnaissance
planes located Ozawa’s decoy fleet, he pursued them
just as the IJN command had predicted, leaving the San
Bernardino Straits unguarded. This allowed the Japanese
Central Fleet to pass through the San Bernardino Straits
unabated and catch Rear Adm. Clifton Sprague and his
Task Unit 77.4.3, Taffy 3, with almost disastrous effect.21
This example describes two opposing commanders,
but the effects of heuristics are clear. The IJN’s understanding of Halsey’s pathological drive to destroy every
IJN carrier allowed Ozawa gain an advantage in support
of Shō-Gō 1. If the IJN had not known about Halsey,
such an audacious tactic would more than likely have
been eliminated from their plans. The importance of
gaining this kind of knowledge and applying this type of
reasoning can be impressed on our own leaders, but this
will not happen spontaneously. Commanders and their
leaders must have a directed dialogue to achieve this
level of knowledge and wisdom, but how?
Cohesive units are forged in the crucible of combat
and training. As steel sharpens steel, so must commanders’ training programs sharpen the steel of their subordinate leaders and troops. It is not enough in complex
OEs to be content with the mere training of tasks.
When units deploy for training to the National Training
Center, the Joint Readiness Training Center, or the Joint
Multinational Readiness Center, what is the end state
for training that leaders are seeking? Are Army forces
using these training environments as a crucible to forge
agile and adaptive officers and soldiers that are allowed
to execute orders within the commander’s intent, while
exercising disciplined initiative and accepting prudent
risk? This is where the promulgation of doctrine and
the inculcation of the mission command philosophy
can provide for the development of creative and critical
thinking throughout the force.
Unfortunately, when units are able to deploy to a major training center, the rotations tend to be nominally for
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training and in reality only for certification. This is counterproductive to the real intent of training. Certification
is templated and uniform and by its very nature restricts
creative thinking. Just as engineers need to be able to assemble a bridge in the dark, in the rain, and with MOPP
4 gear, so must commanders and staffs, who are expected
to deal with unexpected developments in complex OEs,
be able to conduct training that approaches challenges
through creative and critical thinking.
The philosophy of mission command allows commanders and units to create an environment of trust
and dialogue. One part of trust is that subordinates trust
their leaders to allow them to fail. Allowing subordinates
the freedom to fail in training serves two purposes. First,
learning by success is very difficult because there are few
lessons learned. In unit training, expectations should be
limited to functional competence, with the understanding that the subordinate leadership can choose their
own courses of action in support of their commanders.
Second, taking risks that could lead to failure in training
is, in a manner of speaking, another form a dialogue. It
is through the independence of action that subordinate
leaders have in mission command that commanders can
begin to visualize and develop how and what their subordinates think and will do when confronted with certain
stressors and situations.
This is a major ideological shift in training Army
units. Units should focus on training to get better, not
simply training to win an exercise or training just to
check the block. Training should be meaningful by
facilitating dialogue with the aim of engendering trust
between a unit and its commander.
Exercise Disciplined Initiative, Use
Mission Orders, and Accept Prudent
Risk
As the principles of the mission command philosophy are inculcated within a unit, commanders and
staffs should be comfortable in allowing their subordinates to exercise disciplined initiative within the
commander’s intent. When units have a foundation
of confidence, trust, and dialogue through a robust
professional development program, subordinate leaders
should be willing and able to take the reins on their
part of an operation because they have developed confidence in their own ability and in that of their subordinates. As described in ADRP 6-0,
January-February 2015 MILITARY REVIEW