Military Review English Edition January-February 2015 | Page 31

PREPARING FOR UNCERTAINTY 21st Century Offensive Tactics,” Australians Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan posit that war can be viewed as a dialectic struggle between the offense and defense.18 They describe how as soon as one force gains an advantage, the other quickly counters it. They believe that since detection technology has greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the offense, the defense has countered with traditional countermeasures such as dispersion and decentralized operations to operate below the detection threshold. To regain the upper hand against this type of defense, the offense needs to decentralize operations as well. For the U.S. Army, training lethal units that can effectively shoot, move, and communicate in varied environments is critical to our ability to meet this latest evolution in the offense versus defense fight. The Army certainly has spent years perfecting an approach to lethality and effectiveness but in the process has lost sight of fundamentals. Units should train on much more than the standard gunnery tables. These are scientific and formulaic but fail to account for uncertainty on the battlefield. Training should require smaller elements to react to unfolding events in multiple environments and quickly gain operational or firepower dominance while limiting civilian casualties in the operational area. The current decisive action rotations slotted for Army training centers certainly are moving in this direction. Leader Development Goals None of these approaches to increasing soldiers’ knowledge and preparedness for uncertainty will work without a way to evaluate their effectiveness. Each element should be evaluated as a part of normal leader development and training activities. As part of counseling noncommissioned and commissioned officers, the study of warfare should play a part in educational goals. When a rater writes leader evaluations, those goals should be addressed, and the rater should determine if they were met. Similarly, as smaller units improve their ability to conduct decentralized operations, unit leaders must ascertain the failures, successes, and lessons of training. Following training events at all levels, leaders should drive home the lessons of fighting and adapting in an uncertain environment. Conclusion The Army frequently gives lip service to the complexity of environments in which it has battled during the last decade, while predicting environments that are more complex in the future. However, to ensure soldiers are prepared for such a future, more than lip service is needed. The Army must leverage the lessons of the past. As Huba Wass de Czege writes, “The business of war has never been simple and those that tried in the past to reduce its practice to mere formulas were defeated.”19 The Army needs to find a balance with the (Photo by Ruediger Hess , Visual Information Specialist) training of tasks and the U.S. Army soldiers with 6th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, conduct virtual convoy training 8 February 2008 in Baumholder, Germany. education of warfare. It MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2015 29