Military Review English Edition January-February 2015 | Page 24
the mental transition toward full
security responsibility. In fact, this
transition may have been the most
important. Predicated on successful
security operations, the Afghans’
newfound confidence will prove
critical to their success and development into 2015 and beyond.
Lessons Learned
Transitions and the way they
are managed profoundly affect the
long-term security environment in a
given country. How then can transitions be managed to positively shape
the future operational and strategic
environments so the United States
and its allies can achieve their objectives and secure their long-term
interests?
Less on one: planning. The first
lesson is to plan early and often.
Commanders and staffs should
anticipate transitions likely to occur
and identify how they interact to influence the operational and strategic
environments.
Besides identifying early the majority of the transitions set to occur
across the country, the ISAF Joint
Command recognized that a fundamental tension existed between reductions in force posture and its ongoing
ability to support the ANSF. The ISAF Joint Command
balanced each requirement, making sure the ANSF
received sufficient support during the elections and the
2014 fighting season while simultaneously retrograding
non-mission-essential equipment to achieve required
force posture levels by the end of 2014.
In addition, the Command identified whether tasks
funded under Section 1206 of the National Defense
Authorization Act would be continued, amended, or
discontinued during Resolute Support. They also identified who—contractors, the Department of State, the
government of Afghanistan, or someone else—would
assume responsibility for these requirements.2
Lesson two: flexibility. Second, commanders should
build flexibility into their plans because delays and
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unanticipated consequences will most certainly occur.
The way to prepare for the unexpected is to make flexible
plans. For example, the ISAF Joint Command planned
and pushed hard to complete the transfer and closure of
bases by 15 November to allow time for any unforeseen
requirements before the end of their mandate. They also
maintained the capability to surge engineer assets—both
over-the-horizon engineers and United States Central
Command material recovery elements—to assist with
retrograde and redeployment. Working with United
States Central Command, they maintained the capability to support intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets during the elections, fighting season, and
high-risk retrograde and redeployment activities.
Lesson three: transparency. Third, it is important
to be as transparent as possible, especially with host-nation forces, to manage expectations and ensure common
January-February 2015 MILITARY REVIEW