Military Review English Edition January-February 2015 | Page 113

RUSSIA AS THREAT

overwrought. Only twice in history has Russia been
able to drive into the heart of Europe. The first
time was at the climax of the Napoleonic Wars
in 1814, when the Russian army briefly occupied
Paris. The second was at the end of World War
II, when the Soviet army reached Berlin. In each
case, Western Europe had been severely weakened
by wars. Thus, in ordinary times, Western Europe
appears quite capable of resisting Russia.
Furthermore, for the foreseeable future, Russia
will not be able to project sizable conventional forces far beyond its borders due to present shortages
of manpower and the lingering effects of steeply
reduced funding levels after the end of the Cold
War.64 According to the Kremlin’s own assessment,
the Russian army performed miserably in the war
with Georgia.65 Additionally, at the present time,
Russia is surrounded (beyond the former Soviet
sphere) by countries and regions that are more dynamic—politically, economically, and demographically—than it is.66 Simply put, Russia’s conventional
forces would be no match for its principal neighbors—neither NATO in the west nor China in the
east.67
Setting aside suspicions regarding Russian territorial ambitions, the saber rattling between the
United States and Russia is extremely counterproductive for both. Although Western leaders may
bristle at Putin’s authoritarianism and aggression,
it would be folly to resurrect the Cold War with
Russia. First, for obvious reasons, it advisable that
both countries refrain from rhetoric that could ignite a new arms race or even nuclear confrontation.
With a greatly reduced conventional force, Russia’s
strategic strength lies in its nuclear warheads left
over from the Soviet era.68 Despite big cuts, these
arsenals remain large, and the consequences of
their actual use are unthinkable.69 Moreover, many
of the weapons are still on high alert, thus the possibility of an accidental unauthorized launch of a
warhead continues.70
Irrespective, in a May 2014 interview with
the Wall Street Journal, Secretary of State John
Kerry stated that the Obama administration was
fully aware that a confrontation with Russia over
Ukraine could lead to nuclear war.71 Such rhetoric
is, to say the very least, astoundingly inadvisable,
MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2015

running the unnecessary risk of escalation of global
annihilation not unlike the Cuban Missile Crisis of
1962.
Ironically, the current situation is in reality a
window of opportunity for the United States (and
the West in general). Setting aside their serious differences and competitive political instincts, including the unlawful incursion into Ukraine, Russia and
the United States need each other. On many vital
issues confronting the two nations long term, the
interests of the United States, Western Europe, and
Russia closely parallel and often overlap.
For example, for the foreseeable future, the U.S.
military will be involved in fighting a protracted and
open-ended conflict with implacable terrorists and
global insurgents-mainly from the world of Islamic
extremists-bent on overthrowing the West. This
stems in large measure from the chronic instability
that bedevils the Middle East, North Africa, and
Central Asia as evidenced by the recent turmoil
in Libya and the attempted establishment of the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria by well-armed and
well-funded radicals. Inasmuch as the United States
is in the forefront of combating global jihadism, it is
important to maintain a solid front with other nations facing the same threat—especially with Russia.
As it happens, Russia shares with the United
States a constant and unabated internal threat from
radical Islamic groups with similar avowed aims
against the state, mostly from the Caucasus region.
Thus, like the United States, Russia is engaged in
what is now a long and dangerous open-ended
conflict with militant Islam. The interests of both
nations will be much better served by increased
efforts to cooperate more closely to combat that mutual threat and deal with it globally. (To share how
closely United States and Russian interests coincide
in this area, it is useful to note that Chechen and
Uzbek jihadists have been found fighting U.S. troops
in Afghanistan.)72
In another area, the U.S. government is concerned about the stability and security of its primary
Middle Eastern ally, Israel, and its other key regional
allies, Jordan and Egypt. Similarly, the Kremlin is
concerned over the fate of its long-term ally, Syria,
and for its own national interests, wants a stable
and peaceful Levant.
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