The Freedom of Constraint : A Multilevel Simulation Model of Politics , Fertility and Economic Development
with the implications of the model derived from rational decision-making by individuals ( Feng et al ., 2000 ).
At the same time , it is also argued that political stability and political capacity play a critical role in a country ’ s growth path . At the macro level , political instability impacts government policy-making by pulling resources away from other programs ; at the micro level , it impacts individual decisions by reducing the physical capital stock ( Feng et al ., 2000 ). Scholars also show that politically capable governments improve a variety of economic activities , such as attracting investment , enhancing trade and reducing inflation , and so on ( Arbetman & Kugler , 1997 ). Feng et al . ( 2000 ) present a formal model that characterizes the two trajectories of development : a poverty trap with persistent economic stagnation , and industrialization and rising incomes , and establishes that the interaction between politics and economics determines which path a nation travels . In one of the latest POFED pieces of literature , Abdollahian , Kugler , Nicholson , and Oh ( 2010 ) have emphasized the dynamic interrelationships between income , fertility , human capital , political effectiveness , and social stability . They show that fertility rates depend on the income level , and that income depends on past income and political conditions . There is generational feedback on the creation of human capital , as increased education would increase political capacity and income . Political instability also has a temporal feedback and depends on political capacity . Similarly , political capacity depends on per capita income , fertility rate , and level of instability . Their system of equations describes how the five main components work at the society level , which can be empirically tested via two systems of equations : one at the aggregated individual level focusing on human capital , fertility , and income , and the other at the society level focusing on instability and political capacity .
3 . Complex Adaptive Systems
One general critique of the formal or empirical macrolevel , structural analysis across most of social science is that aggregate structures often help explain or predict necessary , but not sufficient conditions of political , economic , and social phenomena . Many individual level explanations , spanning positive political theory , microeconomics , and game theoretic behavior might provide insights into human agency and thus offer the promise of theory sufficiency ( Farmer & Foley , 2009 ).
However , recent advances in complex adaptive systems work ( Abdollahian , Yang , Coan , & Yesilada , 2013 ; Abdollahian , Yang , & deWerk Neal , 2014 ; Abdollahian , Yang , deWerk Neal , & Kaplan , 2015 ; Holland , 1995 ) demonstrate how macro structures provide political , social , and economic environments that constrain or incentivize human behavior in which a human agency can act , react , and interact , thus changing macrolevel structures . Thus , both structural analysis
5