International Journal of Indonesian Studies Volume 1, Issue 3 | Page 190
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN STUDIES
SPRING 2016
namely some non-Islamic kingdoms (Abdurrahman Wahid, 1999b, p. 167). This was due to
their beliefs in the Fiqh paradigm. They persisted with the Fiqh paradigm when they were
able to establish some Islamic kingdoms so that Islam and state were different identities,
but both developed mutual legitimacy (Abdurrahman Wahid, 1999a, p. 54). These Islamic
kingdoms facilitated the creation of some institutions to implement Shari’a (Islamic law),
and Sultans ruled the countries with the help of the clerics. However, this did not mean that
the rulers were immune from any criticism as their responsibilities were worldly affairs, not
religious affairs. Indeed, the clerics tended to support the status quo because they were
afraid of the outbreak of anarchy which would cause the problem of establishing religious
order. Moreover, the Muslims respected the judicature system by non-Muslim rulers of the
Netherland East Indies and Gunseikan, as this judicature system is not an integral part of
religious practices (ibadah), implying a secular affair, so that they did not insist on
implementing the legacy of Islamic kingdoms.
The Muslims’ quality support to the existing political system was dynamic,
depending on the government’s policies toward the Muslims. The Muslim traditionalists’
support for the Netherland East Indies was weaker than for the Gunseikan and, furthermore
later, the Republic of Indonesia. This was because the NEI’s policies were less conducive to
the development of Islam in Indonesia. These Muslim traditionalists did not challenge the
existing political system directly and accepted the predominantly secular nature of political
systems. Conversely, they tried to develop themselves in order to increase their bargaining
power with the government.
In the early 20th century, Muslims were divided into three different paradigms that
were the secular, the Islamic ideological, and the Fiqh paradigms. In this regard, the
Gunseikan had an important role in developing communication and cooperation amongst
leaders of different paradigms, in the governmental or semi-governmental institutions. By
having a series of discussions at BPUPKI (Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan
Indonesia), the leaders of different paradigms were able to reach a compromise and
accepted the national ideology of Pancasila. This agreement was called the Jakarta Charter
and signed on 22nd June, 1945. Traditional Muslim leaders supported the Jakarta Charter
when it was signed. By so doing, they agreed to proclaim a state that was not secular and
not Islamic. This nature of state was maintained when Indonesia proclaimed its
independence, but the Constitution of the state was modified in 18 August 1945 by PPKI
(Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia) to appease the demand of the Christians in
eastern Indonesia, Kalimantan, and the Batak land as well as those “abangan” Muslims who
did not want to comply with Shari’a (Islamic law) and dominated PPKI. These constitutional
changes were about the task of the state in supporting the Muslims to implement Shari’a.
Apart from the removal of the Jakarta Charter, the Muslim traditionalists, namely NU, Perti,
and Jami’atul Wasyilah, based on the principles of the Fiqh paradigm, namely the main goal
of establishing an independent state would not be nullified by the subsidiary goal for
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