Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2016 | Page 92
Global Security and Intelligence Studies
2004, Nigeria’s defense minister paid a state visit to China. China reciprocated by,
among other things, agreeing to supply new combat jets to Nigeria, signing a contract
with Nigeria’s defense ministry worth over $250 million to transfer 15 Chengdu F/FT-
7NI aircrafts in 2005 (Chau 2007). Transfers of sophisticated Chinese arms are usually
followed by training of African military personnel on how to use them. Accordingly,
in 2006 several Nigerian pilots traveled to China to undergo training on the use of the
new aircrafts. In addition to the transfer of aircrafts, China also transferred air-to-air
missiles, rockets, and anti-tank bombs, among others, worth $32 million. Between
2004 and 2006 other arms transfer or military assistance agreements between China
and Nigeria were worth over $70 million involving supplies of patrol boats, trainer
and fighter aircraft, and military transports. There are several other examples of China
cementing its relationship with African countries through military assistance. Among
the many examples is China’s donation of $43 million worth of military equipment
to Nigeria in October 2005. The equipment ranged from uniforms, communication
technology, bullet proof helmets and vests, to computers, among other things (Enuka
2011). China did not just transfer this equipment to Nigeria, but the transfer was later
followed by several Chinese military experts whose mission was to train Nigerian
military personnel on how to use the donated equipment.
Within the past decade, the 10 African countries with the highest level of
military cooperation with China are Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, South
Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Alessi and Xu 2015). Although the
value of arms transfers from China to Africa could be described as modest compared to
trade in oil and other commodities, military interactions are carried out through high
level political delegations, while arms transfers and high level bilateral ties are used
as instruments to help secure more economic access to critical raw materials. Since
the end of the 1990s high level military delegations have been a regular occurrence
between Beijing and several African countries. Of the 10 countries engaged in high
levels of military cooperation with China, six of them are either suppliers of oil, gas,
and other critical resources, or they have substantial Chinese commercial investments.
This places China–Africa weapons transfers and military cooperation into two
distinct dimensions: (1) countries with strategic minerals like Sudan and Nigeria, and
South Africa, and the Democratic Republic of Congo; and (2) anchor states/regional
influentials/sub-regional hegemons like South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia,
among others. In some cases there is an overlap between the two where geo-economic
countries like Sudan, Nigeria, and South Africa are also regional hegemons.
China’s Arms Sales Strategy to Africa
During the 1990s, Chinese weapons were considered to be substandard in
firepower and offensive capability vis à vis the most simplistic, low-tech military
armaments available, and limited to a defensive capacity, having only “nuisance
value” (Bitzinger 1991). Consequently, Chinese weapons exports were limited to less
than 10%. However, Chinese arms sales, especially in Africa, have increased. China
has aggressively marketed its weapons to poorer and less technologically advanced
86