Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2016 | Page 82

Global Security and Intelligence Studies
practical study will fill in gray areas very quickly” (Maddox and Stuckenberg 2015). DHS
and other governmental agencies should collaborate with universities to promote and
endorse such research. Students are ideal candidates to conduct such experiments. They
can go through the unfamiliar process of targeting by conducting reconnaissance by
visiting the site or through open source intelligence collection. They can then research
and purchase a drone through the same unclassified mediums a lone wolf would use,
learn how to fly and program the drone and attempt an attack with mock explosives in
a controlled setting under approved conditions. Such experimentation can transform
theoretical studies into practical application, aiding refinement of defense mechanisms
and exploring the possible terrorist applications of consumer drones.
Conclusions and Recommendations for Additional Research
For less than $1,600, anyone can acquire a ready to fly, GPS-enabled and cameraequipped
consumer drone that can carry a small amount of weight. This offers
terrorists new capabilities in executing attacks, particularly the ability to bypass
traditional security measures and gain unprecedented access to a vulnerable target.
Lone wolves in the United States break the mold of global terrorism, motivated by antigovernmental
ideologies more than religious or other principles. Innovators among
these lone wolves may use consumer drones to target a number of long-term static,
temporary static or mobile targets in the coming years.
Consumer drones currently on the market offer a diversity of capabilities, of
which payload, maximum range and maximum speed are most important. None of
these can carry more than 1.0 kg of a substance, significantly limiting the destructive
capacity of an explosive-laden drone; even so, a precision attack can render devastating
effects against a vulnerable target. It is very likely that lone wolves will continue to use
firearms and bombs in attacks rather than explosive-laden consumer drones due to a
much higher probability of inflicting more casualties and causing more damage.
A variety of sophisticated defense mechanisms exist which can detect small
drones at low altitudes, but there are few mechanisms capable of interdicting a drone
in flight toward a target. Collaboration between government agencies and drone
manufacturers may improve security conditions by implementing no-fly zones over
sensitive sites through firmware, potentially delaying or deterring many attacks. Such
defenses can help secure long-term static targets, but temporary static targets and
mobile targets remain vulnerable, generally reliant on the human eye for detection with
no reliable interdiction mechanisms.
Legislation limiting payload capacity of consumer drones can curtail future
challenges associated with this type of terrorist attack. Additionally, legislation
requiring geofencing firmware in drones offers a viable defense mechanism that drone
manufacturers can quickly implement. Much of this new field remains unexplored,
especially terrorist applications of drones, as most research is theoretical, without
practical experiments or trials. Academia can hedge the risks of nefarious innovators
by exploring the bounds of consumer drones before lone wolves, enhancing defense
efforts by exposing vulnerabilities.
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