Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2016 | Page 71

An Assessment of Lone Wolves Using Explosive-Laden Consumer Drones in the United States
support the large bombs and high death tolls characteristic of Al-Qaeda or Islamic
State attacks. Similarly, martyrdom is a chief objective sought after by Islamic State
operatives, who either conduct a suicide attack equipped with a bomb on their person
or plan a complex attack, shooting a crowd until killed. Such groups generally use
bombs and firearms in attacks and seek shock and awe through publicity, but utilizing
a drone detracts from this objective given the limited carnage. These factors may
explain why larger terrorist groups, which have the resources and means to purchase
or capture a drone and equip the drone with explosives, have not attempted such an
attack in the United States.
The closest semblance of a specialized attack with a drone occurred when the
FBI foiled a plot in September 2011 involving large model aircraft. The FBI arrested
Rezwan Ferdaus, a Massachusetts-based Al-Qaeda supporter, who planned to target
the Pentagon and East Potomac Park with model aircraft packed with explosives
supplied by FBI undercover employees he believed to be Al-Qaeda operatives (“Man
Sentenced” 2012). Although the scenario did not meet criteria for a lone wolf incident,
Ferdaus’ independent purchase of model aircraft, personal surveillance of targets,
and innovative plot to fly explosive-laden model planes into targets demonstrates the
feasibility of a sole actor acquiring the materials necessary for a similar attack. Large
terrorist groups have had the means to conduct an attack with drones, Consumer drones
seem particularly attractive to lone wolves, as opposed to members of established
terrorist groups, due to affordable prices, risk-averse utility, and payoffs closely aligned
with objectives of lone wolf terrorists, as evidenced by trends of domestic lone wolf
terrorism.
In the past, the expensive nature of aerial platforms likely deterred lone wolves
from experimenting with such a tool in an attack. Individuals plotting without outside
resourcing or support were generally restricted to either stealing an industrial drone
used for crop dusting or commercial purposes or purchasing an expensive model
through hobbyist channels. High costs and restrictive supply channels made such a
prospect highly unlikely to domestic lone wolves, who were generally “unemployed,
single white males with a criminal record” (Hamm and Spaaj 2015, 6). Trends since
2012 indicate domestic terrorists are younger and often without a criminal record due
to their youth, largely due to Islamic State recruiting efforts on social media platforms.
Consumer drones, with popular models priced below $2,000 and likely to become more
affordable in coming years, are now within purchasing ability of the typical lone wolf
in the United States. Purchasing these models does not require a background check,
nor is specialized training required to operate these drones, enabling an individual to
acquire and gain proficiency on a drone with minimal personal interactions.
Consumer drones offer advantages to risk-averse lone wolves. Lone wolves
in the United States generally “mix personal vendettas with established ideologies,”
seeking political change or retaliation for some perceived wrong while maintaining a
degree of self-preservation (Eby 2012, 34). The most common ideologies fueling attacks
include Islamist, anti-government, anti-abortion, racism, and personal motivations.
Between September 11, 2011 and June 30, 2016, approximately 40.3% of domestic
lone wolf incidents were motivated by Islamist ideologies, in many cases inspired by
65