Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2016 | Page 51

Calculation of Goodwill
with positive views increasing from 15% in 2003 to 38% in 2005 (Pew Research Global
Attitudes Project 2005). At roughly the same time, U.S. public opinion polls revealed
that 83% of Americans approved of the U.S. relief mission (ABC News/Washington
Post 2004). Favorable views of the United States from Indonesians did not return to
pre-Iraq War levels until 2009. According to Blank (2013), “The goodwill the tsunami
relief brought the U.S. is incalculable. Nearly a decade later, the effort may rank as
one of the most concrete reasons Southeast Asian nations trust the long-term U.S.
commitment to a strategy of Asian re-balancing.”
The 2004 tsunami was one of the first natural disasters in which global news
organizations relied on images and video from individuals in locations where waves
crashed onto coastal areas (Macmillan 2005a). The human suffering depicted online
and delivered by television served as the foundation for citizen media coverage of
subsequent natural disasters and armed conflicts (Handwerk 2005; Macmillan 2005b;
Pottinger 2005; Regan 2005; Schwartz 2005). However, it was difficult and challenging
for media networks to determine the accuracy and veracity of the overall coverage and
extent of the damage.
For the United States, Indonesia is important in maintaining stability in
Southeast Asia given its strategic location within maritime transport lines (Caryl 2005;
Sullivan 2004). Moreover, the country has experienced terrorism, sectarian violence,
and armed conflict. According to former Secretary of State Colin Powell, “This is
an investment not only in the welfare of these people; it’s an investment in our own
national security” (see O’Lery 2005). Given the significance of Indonesia in Asia and
the Pacific, the leading government donors of humanitarian assistance committed
$717.5 million in 2005 before falling to $184 million in 2011 with U.S. bilateral aid
increasing from $43.3 to $82.2 during this same time (GHA 2012).
Then, the United States moved quickly in Japan following the disaster at the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant on March 11, 2011. The catastrophic failure of
three nuclear reactors occurred when the facility was struck by a tsunami triggered
by the Tōhoku earthquake leading to what became the worst nuclear catastrophe
since the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. The U.S. responded with Operation Tomodachi to
shore up the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) responding to the disaster with the
deployment of roughly 24,000 U.S. military personnel, a carrier group off the coast of
Miyagi Prefecture, 19 naval vessels, and 140 aircraft (Wada 2011). U.S. forces aided SDF
with the rescue and evacuation of survivors, delivery of meals and safe drinking water,
medical assistance, and with repairs to infrastructure (Mizushima 2012). Operation
Tomodachi was considered a successful joint humanitarian operation that “validated
years of bilateral training, exercises, and planning” and promoted regional economic
stability (Mizushima 2012).
Tomadachi was positively received by broad segments of the Japanese
population with support for the United States soaring in the wake of the humanitarian
operation. Japan’s perception of the United States was already positive prior to the
nuclear disaster with 66% expressing favorable views of the United States in a spring
2010 poll. One year later, after the tsunami struck Fukushima, that number skyrocketed
to 85%, which was the highest positive rating among the 23 nations included in the
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