Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2016 | Page 43

Calculation of Goodwill
through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded.” Finnemore
(1996, 2–3) adds, the “normative context also changes over time, and as internationally
held norms and values change, they create coordinated shifts in state interests and
behaviour across the system.” Claude (1966, 367–379) emphasizes the significance of
legitimate action and Wheeler (2000, 4) observes that since “legitimacy is constitutive
of international action,” norms and beliefs can either constrain states or force them to
set criteria for humanitarian operations. Commonly-held beliefs serve as the basis for
understanding global norms regarding sovereignty, humanitarian action, and human
suffering (Acharya and Buzan 2010; Bellamy 2003; Buzan 2004; Gibbs 2009; Kuperman
2008; Orford 2003; Reus-Smit 2001; Wheeler 2000). Consequently, human security
must be incorporated into an understanding of how global actors respond to natural
disasters, recover from catastrophe, and help rebuild in the wake of destruction (Cox
1999; Shaw 2000; Sinclair 1996).
Humanitarian action rests on assumptions that people possess rights and
freedoms that states and global institutions must protect regardless of social and
economic condition (Butler 2001; Devetak 2007; Janse 2006). Shared notions of
morality define human rights and sustain a mutual humanity (Fixdal and Smith 1998).
Failing to address physical security and basic protections of people suffering from
natural disasters would constitute a deprivation of human rights and human security
(Coates 2003; ICRC 1977).
Several international legal instruments establish guidelines for minimum
standards of humanity. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions sets out
binding standards by maintaining that states should treat persons humanely,
prohibit violence and assaults on human dignity, and must treat the injured and sick.
Moreover, a state’s failure to consent to the delivery of humanitarian aid within its
borders threatens the survival of the civilian population (Stoffels 2004). If states block
humanitarian assistance, they would be in violation of international statutes in the
Geneva Conventions (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck 2009, 105, 193). However, the
need for the afflicted state to consent to humanitarian operations within its borders
is not clearly established. While human security provides a principled basis for
humanitarian operations, state sovereignty is a powerful force that limits intervention
(Devetak 2007).
Strategic Interests and State Sovereignty
The role of strategic factors, such promoting economic prosperity and balancing
against challengers, means that state sovereignty and jurisdictional exclusivity are key
to whether states become involved in humanitarian operations (Chayes and Chayes
1996). International statutes reinforce these. The Charter of the Organization of
American States (OAS 1967, Article 18) states that “No State or groups of States has
the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason what so ever, in the internal
or external affairs of any other State.” Article 2 (7) in the U.N. Charter raises the right
of state sovereignty, preventing powerful states from violating the territorial integrity
of weaker states. Pham (2004) contends that the shroud of humanitarianism might
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