Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2016 | Page 13

Academic Intelligence Programs in the United States
advanced analysis that qualify analysts for more senior positions, while
other agencies offer almost none or very tailored training that does not
directly support a well-rounded, “complete” analyst. Such professional
development seems at best implicit and ad hoc. (Bruce and George
2015, 7)
In addition to more formalized, extensive analytic training, the IC has
increasingly stressed a range of techniques—generally labeled SATs—as well as new
analytic standards and competencies. These efforts have essentially been part and
parcel of the introduction of the ODNI. The Analytic Tradecraft Standards, a core
facet of Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203, require analysts and agencies
to address issues of quality, credibility, and uncertainty; make assumptions explicit
and consider the implications of those assumptions being incorrect; differentiate
assumptions from information; explain conditions of change and continuity; apply
alternative analyses; and present products that employ likelihoods, are customer
relevant with key information upfront, and contain logical, accurate judgments.
ICD 203 is intended to “govern the production and evaluation of analytic
products” in the IC (Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2015, 1). The
standards represent the “core principles of intelligence analysis and are to be applied
across the IC” (Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2015, 1). They are also
meant to inform IC approaches to analytic education and training.
The SATs devised for use in the IC can generally be categorized as contrarian,
imaginative, or diagnostic techniques (Central Intelligence Agency 2009). These
techniques include the following: brainstorming, key assumptions check, devil’s
advocacy, quality of information check, brainstorming, team A/team B, indicators and
signposts of change, high-impact/low-probability analysis, what if analysis, analysis of
competing hypotheses, outside-in thinking, red team analysis, and alternative futures
analysis (Central Intelligence Agency 2009). The use of SATs seems to vary across the
IC. Federal Bureau of Investigations analysts are required to demonstrate some use of
SATs for promotional advancement (Gentry 2015) while other IC elements use SATs
very minimally (Coulthart 2016).
The ICD 610 series sets out core competencies across a range of intelligence
occupations and positions. The baseline set, used by Spracher in his study of academic
intelligence curricula, was presented above. The competency set for analysis and
production include understanding collection systems capabilities and customer
operations and requirements (Arant Kaspar 2014). Processing and exploitation,
research, and tools and methods round out this competency set (Arant Kaspar 2014).
Criticisms and Concerns: U.S. Analytic Training, Tradecraft, and Standards
Some have voiced skepticism about current IC analytic training, and the
tradecraft that training tends to focus on, as well as propositions relating to analytic
professionalization. Matthew Herbert has suggested that contemporary intelligence
analysis, specifically in the U.S. context, is so varied as to defy efforts at a clean, uniform
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