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notification to the troops involved – the Russian Federation bypassed its politically-binding
obligations as a participating state of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) and was thus not obliged to internationally announce the exercise in advance or to invite
foreign military observers. This raised some controversial debate about whether Russia’s exercise was
a direct response to Norway’s military activities or not (Bentzrød 2015a). While such a connection is
difficult to prove and Russia was also arguably compliant with its international obligations, its
behaviour did not – and probably was not supposed to – send an unequivocal signal of détente. It
rather lines up in a series of events which seem to mark a decreasing level of trust in the region.
By the end of the Cold War the Arctic had only a limited potential for military conflict (Welch 2013:
2 f.). In fact, for years the Arctic was characterized by researchers and diplomats alike as an
environment in which any form of military escalation was very unlikely (Welch 2013; Lind 2014; Bergh
2014; Wezeman 2014). One could argue that the Arctic was developing towards a convincing example
of a ‘Security Community.’ On the other hand, unlike the theoretical concept that Emanuel Adler and
Michael Barnett had proposed, this ‘Arctic security community’ had started to form around ‘soft’
security issues in the ‘economic and environmental’ as well as in the ‘human’ dimension of security
and beyond the traditional understanding of states as the only capable security providers. At the same
time, ‘hard’ security issues were excluded from much of the Arctic security discourse and this
incomprehensive security approach has made the region vulnerable to spillover-effects of geo-political
tensions emanating from the crisis around Ukraine. As these now seem to slowly threaten even the
good track record of cooperation on ‘soft’ security issues in the Arctic, this article advocates for a
broadening of the theoretical concept of ‘Security Communities’, to include security issues along all
three dimensions of the OSCE’s comprehensive security approach as well as to consider additional
actors and providers of security, other than the state.
For this purpose, the article will first briefly outline the traditional theoretical concept of security
communities. Afterwards, it assesses the extent to which the Arctic today can be considered a
traditional security community, and to what degree spillover effects from the crisis in and around
Ukraine have influenced this development, if at all. This analysis shall also highlight some of the
shortcomings of the traditional concept of security communities in which security issues are not
sufficiently addressed across all three security dimensions and almost exclusively dominated by states.
The article will conclude by discussing the advantages of enhancing the traditional concept of security
communities. It will furthermore discuss ways through which the Arctic states can facilitate the
formation of a comprehensive Arctic security community in the future and how the region might even
be able to transform into a proving ground for restoring trust and mutual confidence beyond its
borders.
Practical examples used in this article will be primarily chosen from the bilateral relations between
Norway and Russia. As this article does not claim to deliver a full-fledged in-depth analysis, the
presented line of argumentation should be treated as an initiatory discussion for broader ones on
security in the High North in the future.
Schaller